DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN DI MALAYSIA
RAYUAN SIVIL NO: J-02-385-2006

ANTARA

1. CHONG SWEE HUAT	**…**	**PERAYU-**
2. KOLEJ SELATAN		**PERAYU**

DAN

LIM SHIAN GHEE		
T/A L&G CONSULTANTS &		
EDUCATION SERVICES	**…**	**RESPONDEN**

(DALAM PERKARA GUAMAN SIVIL NO. 22-530-2000
DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI JOHOR BAHRU)

ANTARA

LIM SHIAN GHEE		
T/A L&G CONSULTANTS &		
EDUCATION SERVICES	**…**	**PLAINTIF**

DAN

1. CHONG SWEE HUAT	**…**	**DEFENDAN-**
2. KOLEJ SELATAN		**DEFENDAN**

CORAM:

JAMES FOONG CHENG YUEN, J.C.A.
ZAINUN ALI, J.C.A.
VINCENT NG KIM KHOAY, J.C.A.

JUDGMENT OF
ZAINUN ALI, JCA

Before us, the Defendant's appeal is against the whole of the judgment of the High Court at Johor Bahru delivered on 16th March 2006, which allowed the Plaintiff's claim. The High Court had found that the First Appellant had committed the tort of libel against the Plaintiff and awarded the Plaintiff a sum of -

(i) RM200,000.00 as General Damages;

(ii) RM50,000.00 as Aggravated Damages;

(iii) RM980,000.00.00 as Special Damages;

(iv) Interest at 8% per annum on the sum or RM1,230,000.00;

and

(v) costs of the action.

The Defendant's primary ground of appeal was that the learned trial judge erred in rejecting the Appellants' defence of justification and awarded Aggravated Damages without proof of any malice and Special Damages of RM980,000.00 based purely on speculative loss of profits.

The defence of justification was specifically pleaded in paragraph 10 of the Amended Defence, that in substance and in fact, the Appellants were justified to state that the existence,

legality and academic quality of "St. Clements University, UK" and "Irish Business School" as institutions of higher learning are in doubt.

Background

The starting point of the discord between the Plaintiff and Defendant can be summarized thus. The plaintiff at the material time was the representative in Peninsular Malaysia, particularly in Johor, of two institutions of higher learning i.e. (a) St. Clements University of Turks and Caicos Island, British West Indies (St. Clements University) and (b) Irish Business School of Dublin, Ireland (Irish Business School). (hereinafter referred to as "the two institutions").

The Plaintiff had on a couple of occasions, promoted the degree programs offered by the two institutions to students of the 2nd Defendant.

Students of Southern College (i.e. 2nd Defendant) were largely studying for a diploma or a certificate. The Plaintiff's selling point was that some degree qualifications from these two institutions would be accepted by the Malaysian Association of the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (MAICSA) and the Association of International Accountants (AIA). The Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam (JPA) would also accord recognisition, on condition that the holder of such a degree has already gained a first degree from another university which JPA recognises.

The First Defendant is an advisor to the Southern College. He was formerly its chief executive. Southern College is a non-profit private college, funded by public donation.

In defamation suits such as this, it would be helpful if the characters involved, their standing in society, the sequence of events, the words written and ascribed to the Defendant construed to be offensive, the meanings attributed to them, the context in which they were written, their accuracy, precision or nuances, all need to be considered. The reason is simple. Although a small part of the law of defamation has been codified in our Defamation Act, 1957, defamation is largely fraught with technicalities.

Questions of burden of proof, identification, publication and the various defences available to the Defendant are in themselves notable for their intricacy.

In this context, it is crucial to elicit from the evidence what was the relationship between the parties; how and when did they get into contact with each other? What transpired between them; what is the understanding they had etc.

A brief background of each of the parties will undoubtedly assist us here.

The Plaintiff is basically a man with many 'hats'. He acts as agent for educational and professional courses run by foreign universities and professional bodies; he is an education counselor;

he is also an accounting/taxation consultant and also acts as a life insurance agent.

It was his enterprising nature that led to him getting in touch with one Dr. David Le Cornu, of St. Clements University in 1995, after reading about an advertisement regarding the same. The Plaintiff was able to persuade Dr. Le Cornu to appoint him as the agent in Malaysia, particularly in Johor for St. Clements and their affiliated institutions in respect of educational programs. (See witness statement paragraph 7).

According to the Plaintiff, St. Clements University is a private university registered in Turks and Caicos Islands, British West Indies since 1995.

Between 1994 - 1996 the Plaintiff approached the Defendant, offering to introduce various programs which he claimed would or could improve the academic qualifications of the students of the Southern College in conjunction with the programs organised by the two institutions.

On 2nd January 1996 with the Defendant's approval, the Plaintiff briefed the students of Southern College on courses offered by these two institutions. There were two more subsequent briefings by the Plaintiff on the same.

Thus generally, the Plaintiff acts as a promoter and facilitator who makes arrangements for students of Southern College to sign up for programs or courses offered by the two institutions.

As regards the First Defendant in addition to those earlier stated, his evidence was that the Plaintiff had offered him a Doctoral degree from St. Clements University, UK. The First Defendant testified that he was under the impression that the said University was actually in the UK. He accepted the offer, after complying with the requirements imposed by the Plaintiff.

In the course of things, sometime in 1999 the National Accreditation Board (LAN) issued a circular dated 20th August 1999, a copy of which was sent to Southern College. Basically this circular indicated that the existence and quality of three foreign institutions, i.e.

(a) St. George University International (Established in the Turks and Caicos Islands)

(b) Europe University Ireland

(c) The Irish School of Economics and Management

are in doubt, and that LAN will not process the academic certificates issued by them.

The Southern College then made an addendum at the bottom of the said circular as follows:-

"Note:

Confirmed with British Council (UK)

1. St. Clements University is under Irish Business School

2. No information about St. George University

3. The three Universities listed above are NOT in UK"

(Please see circular attached for its full effect, marked as P20).

This said circular (P20) was displayed by Southern College on its notice board.

A couple of months later, i.e. on 21.4.2000, the First Defendant issued a circular to students and staff of the 2nd Defendant. This document is marked Exhibit P23. It is reproduced here in its entirety. (See attached circular, P23).

This circular P23, basically states that –

(a) information was received from one Yian, a parent that lecturers form Southern College have joined with an outside organisation to introduce degree courses of St. Clements University and Irish Business School in Southern College;

(b) Southern College had in August 1999 brought to the attention of lecturers & students the LAN notice which points out that the legality, existence and academic quality of St. Clements University and Irish Business School were in doubt;

(c) that LAN will not process nor recognise any degree conferred by them (the two institutions).

On Whom Lies The Burden

It is trite that in any action for libel the Plaintiff must prove that the matter complained of:

(i) is defamatory;

(ii) has been published to a third person (publication);

(iii) refers to the Plaintiff.

These three essential ingredients must be proved by the Plaintiff, failing which his action is bound to fail.

It is of course presumed in defamation cases, that the matter complained of is untrue and that damage has been caused to the Plaintiff. Which means that the burden lies on the other foot - i.e. it lies on the Defendant to prove:

(i) that the matter complained of is true and

(ii) that it has not caused the plaintiff damage.

It is also important to note that the question of whether the Defendant intended to defame the Plaintiff is irrelevant. **(Hulton (E) & Co. v. Jones [1910] AC 20)**

Were the Words Defamatory

The Plaintiff says that the words contained in P20 and P23 are defamatory. In P20, the impugned words were those in the note. Taken in the context of the LAN circular are the words defamatory?

The learned trial judge read P20 together with P23 and said that that the salient features of P23, when juxtaposed with P20 and taking into account testimonies of witnesses "*imply by innuendo that the validity, existence and quality of St. Clement University and Irish Business School was also doubted by LAN and confirmed by the British Council. The ordinary person who saw the note on the college notice board like SP3 it is submitted will invariably conclude that the Plaintiff is a cheat and dishonest person who sold to them worthless degree programs of universities whose existence are in doubt and hence it is defamatory of the Plaintiff.*"

Thus the learned trial judge was of the view that the Plaintiff's submission is "meritable" and thus found defamation has been made out against the Plaintiff.

Publication to Third Person

It was in evidence that both the note in P20 and P23 were published. Whilst it was LAN which wrote P20, it was a staff of Southern College who wrote the Note on P20 which was pinned on the Southern College's Notice Board.

P23 was written by the Defendant. P23 was addressed to all students and lecturers of Southern College.

Clearly here the issue of publication to third parties is established.

Proof of Identification

The third and final issue to be proved by Plaintiff is whether on a balance of probabilities the words complained of refer to the Plaintiff. Unless it is proved that the subject matter of the action was published and concerning the Plaintiff, the action is bound to fail.

It is not necessary that the Plaintiff is referred to by name. The Plaintiff can be referred to by caricature, nickname, drawing etc.

In this case, the Plaintiff was not named. The learned trial judge cited cases such as **Institute of Commercial Management United Kingdom v New Straits Times Pres (Malaysia) Bhd. [1993] 1 MLJ 408, Chew Sew Khian v Mohd. Ismail [2003] 5 MLJ 91, Le Mercier's Fine Furnishings Pte. Ltd v Italcomm (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [1996] CLJ 590** and decided that although the plaintiff was not named in the impugned words or statements; "*it is sufficient if those who knew him can make out that he was the person referred*." (page 24 A.R.).

The learned judge explained that this is because the Defendant had admitted that the Plaintiff had given briefings to

students and staff of the Southern College and that from the evidence of SP2, "*most lecturers and students in Southern College (2nd Defendant) knew the Plaintiff and his firm L & G Consultant and Education Services being the sole representative of St. Clements University and Irish Business School in Johor.*"

The learned judge said that this fact is a special fact known to all lecturers and students of Southern College. The judge observed that the words "outside organisation" mentioned in P23 in this context refer to the Plaintiff and his firm L & G Consultant and Education Services. The learned judge concluded that the defamatory words in P23 therefore refers to the Plaintiff and since there is publication it is defamatory of him and hence the Plaintiff's claim of defamation has been made out.

The learned judge then went on to discuss fairly lengthily the defence put up by the Defendant i.e. justification. Though the Defendant claims that the defence of qualified privilege was put up, the learned judge found that that defence was imprecisely formulated.

In any case, after a thorough analysis of the evidence before him, the learned judge found that the Defendant had failed on a balance of probabilities, to defend the Plaintiff's claim of defamation. The learned judge granted the Plaintiff's claim and ordered damages as are found in his Order.

So there you have it. In my view the entire claim of the Plaintiff is merely hogwash and is thus untenable. And it must fail. My reasons are as follows.

Getting down to basics, one has to scrutinise the Plaintiff's claim, discern and analyse whether he has discharged his burden on a balance of probabilities, before we cross the next threshold.

The starting point, in most defamation cases is that the court will only be concerned with the natural and ordinary meaning of the words claimed to be defamatory. This is the meaning that an ordinary, reasonable person would derive from the words, without any special knowledge beyond that which is known to ordinary people generally. Alternatively it is how the words would be understood by 'the man in the street'. Or to put it in another way, as understood by 'Joe Public'. Which means that the Plaintiff must identify what he claims to be the natural and ordinary meaning of the words as understood by the ordinary reader.

In this context the natural and ordinary meaning includes innuendos, i.e. something which is insinuated in or inferred from the words.

The determination of meaning of the impugned words involve both a question of fact and law. The actual meaning of the publication is a question of fact. However the court has a preliminary power to hold that the words are not capable of bearing a particular meaning, which is a question of law. In short, <u>where</u>

the words are not capable of bearing the pleaded meaning, that meaning will be struck out. (my emphasis).

The Plaintiff's claim in his amended statement of claim is that the impugned words in P20 and P23 meant that –

9.1. It gives the impression that LAN had doubted the validity, existence and quality of St. Clements University and Irish Business School;

9.2. that British Council had confirmed that St. Clements University is part of Irish Business school and that the validity, existence and quality of both institutions are in doubt;

9.3. that the Plaintiff for his own selfish financial gain had confused students in promoting the degree programs of St. Clement University and Irish Business School when their validity, existence and quality are doubted by LAN. This shows that the Plaintiff is a dishonest man;

9.4. that the Plaintiff is a cheat and is not qualified to be involved in the business of education;

9.5. by promoting the degree courses of St. Clements University and Irish Business School, the Plaintiff had committed an offence under Akta Insitutusi Pendidikan Tinggi Swasta 1996, which is punishable with a fine of RM100,000 and one year's imprisonment).

The next question would be this: Are the impugned words in P20 and P23 capable of bearing the pleaded meaning above?

In this connection, how the words are to be construed involves an objective test. (See **Youssoupoff v. MGM Pictures Ltd [1934] 50 T.L.R.581**; and **Tolley v. Fry [1931] AC 333**)

For example in **Dwek v. Macmillan Publishers Ltd [2000] E.M.L.R. 284**, the defendants were the publishers of a biography of Mohammed Al Fayed. One of the photographs in the book showed a young woman sitting between two men on a sofa. The caption identified the young woman as a prostitute and one of the men as Dodi Fayed. In fact it was not Dodi Fayed but a dentist named Norman Dwek. The Court of Appeal concluded that an ordinary reader reading between the lines was capable of concluding that the person wrongly described as Dodi Fayed would have had sex with the woman described as a prostitute.

What exactly are the impugned words in the Note to P20 and P23 which the Plaintiff claims is defamatory of him?

One must not lose sight of the fact that the Plaintiff is a promoter of educational programs of several learning institutions, amongst his multifarious function. For an allegation to be considered defamatory, it must impute to the Plaintiff, either some quality which would be detrimental to the successful carrying on of his office, profession or trade, or the absence of some quality which is essential to its success. The failing may be a lack of

judgment, an allegation which in itself might not be considered to involve any moral fault.

In this, there is an element of subjectivity in the test. Let us now look closer at the Note in P20 and the contents of P23.

The Note in P20 says it was confirmed by British Council that St. Clements University is under the Irish Business School. That is all. There is no explicit allegation of adverse remark or comment about either the Plaintiff or the two institutions. By itself, the Note in P20 is in fact bland. In this Note, there is no suggestion or insinuation that the two institutions are in doubt. The Note in fact, is quite cryptic.

In any event, the Plaintiff says that the impugned words are to be construed by reading both the Note in P20 and P23 together. What are the contents of P23?

In P23. the Defendant had stated that LAN in its previous circular (P20) had indicated that the validity, existence and quality of certain named universities are in doubt. The Defendant went further to state that LAN had also attributed the same quality with regard to the two institutions: i.e. that LAN considers that the validity, existence and quality of both St. Clements University and Irish Business School to be in doubt.

Now, whether this is true or otherwise is not relevant at this point, since it is deemed to be true for purposes of this action. Assuming it is, is this defamatory of the Plaintiff?

That is the crux of the issue that falls to be considered. In my view, if at all, the Defendant is guilty of criticising the two institutions. Not the Plaintiff. The Defendant is guilty if at all, of condemning the ‘product’ promoted by the Plaintiff, the ‘product’ being the degrees of St. Clements University and Irish Business School. There is nothing to suggest that the Defendant, whether explicitly or implicitly, criticised or condemned the Plaintiff.

The Note in P20 and the contents of P23 did not, for instance contain words such as :-

> “… Dr. Lim Shian Ghee promotes the degrees of St. Clements University and Irish Business. LAN had held the validity, existence and quality of these two institutions in doubt. We are now doubting the integrity of Dr. Lim.”

Or

> “… where is the professionalism of Dr. Lim Shian Ghee in promoting the degrees of St. Clements University and Irish Business School, when LAN had expressed doubts about them?”.

Or words to that effect.

The impugned words do not contain allegations of lack of integrity or “sharp practices” of the Plaintiff. The impugned words do not state that the Plaintiff is unfit for his profession, calling or trade or even that he has been guilty of a lack of care or judgment.

The impugned words do not cite the Plaintiff’s absence of professionalism or lack of competence. Though I am aware that there are authorities where courts are conscious of the difficulty in

divorcing the "product" (or technique) from the "producer" or even whether the criticism of a professional's technique amounts to imputation of a lack of competence, my view is that a distinction must be made between impugning the "product" or impugning the "professionalism" of the Plaintiff. Though sometimes it overlaps. For example -

In **Drummond Jackson v. BMA [1970] 1 W.L.R. 688** the Court of Appeal held that an attack on the special technique of a dentist was arguably capable of defaming the dentist. However in this case Lord Denning dissented.

My view is this. Where the criticism relates solely to the Plaintiff's product and not to the Plaintiff it will not be defamatory. In this connection the Note in P20 and the contents of P23 relate not to the Plaintiff but to the two institutions which he promoted.

I am mindful though, that the distinction between an allegation relating to the competence and judgment of the Plaintiff as opposed to merely his products or his goods (in this case, the degrees of St. Clements University and Irish Business School) may be difficult to make. But in my view even if the distinction is fine, the distinction must be made for it will impact on the question of liability.

This is important because case laws have shown that where the impugned words focus on the product (in this case, the two institutions) rather than the supplier of the product (i.e. the Plaintiff), defamation is not made out. The succinct observation of

Lord Esher M.R. in **South Hetton Coal v North East News [1894) I.Q.B. 133** is that:-

> "Suppose the plaintiff was a merchant who dealt in wine, and it was stated that wine which he had for sale of a particular vintage was not good wine; that might be so stated as only to say that the wine of the particular year was not good in who-soever hands it was, but not to imply any reflection on his conduct of his business. In that case the statement would be with regard to his goods only and there would be no libel, although such a statement, it if were false and were made maliciously with intention to injure him, and it did injure him, might be the subject of an action on the case (i.e. malicious falsehood). On the other hand, if the statement was made so as to import (or indicate) that his judgment in the selection of wine was bad, it might import a reflection on his conduct of his business, and show that he was an inefficient man of business. If so, it would be a libel. In such a case a jury would have to say which sense the libel really bore; if they thought it related to the goods only, they ought to find that it was not a libel; but, if they thought it related to the man's conduct of business, they ought to find that it was a libel.".

In my view what can be discerned from P20 and P23 is that the Defendant was concerned with the quality of the two institutions. One must remember that the Defendant was the Chief Executive of the Southern College (2nd Defendant) at that time.

That concern is manifested in both P20 and P23. His concern was that the degrees of the two institutions were in doubt. He was not concerned with the demonization of the Plaintiff. Otherwise the impugned words would as I had earlier illustrated,

be couched along the lines indicated in my illustration. The intended meaning is of course irrelevant.

In my view, the end result is that given the authorities, facts and circumstances of this case, the impugned words are not capable of bearing the pleaded meaning. However, if what I had stated above is insufficient to conclude that the impugned words are not of themselves defamatory, a test which would assist us in this quest is to see whether the defamatory allegation is one that tends to make reasonable people think the worst of the claimant. (**Sim v. Stretch [1936] 52 T.L.L. 669**)

Is the Plaintiff shunned or avoided as a result of the defamatory allegation? Is the Plaintiff ridiculed, or exposed to hatred and contempt?

Though it is true that the way in which the words were in fact understood is irrelevant, it would be so, in determining the extent of injury to the Plaintiff's reputation.

The Plaintiff had two witnesses for this purpose. His first witness one Tan Man To, SP2, was a lecturer in the Southern College from October 1995 to 31st March 2000. (i.e. within the time frame the impugned circular P20 and P23 was put on the notice board).

SP2 was awarded a Doctor of Letters by St. Clements University. On 3rd October 1997 he was made an honorary local academic adviser to L & G Consultants & Education Services (the

company owned by Plaintiff). Note that SP2's main duty as local academic advisor was to advise the Plaintiff (who is St. Clements University local academic counselor) on matters which will assist the development of St. Clements University/L & G Consultant and Education Services joint degree program (please see SP2's written statement, para 9 page 189 A.R.).

According to SP2 when he saw P20 on the notice board of Southern College, some of his colleagues in Southern College began to ridicule him saying that the doctorate he obtained from St. Clements University was illegal and that St. Clements University was cheating people.

Note that the above statement was not verified. No one was called to testify as to its truth. The butt of the ridicule if at all true, going by SP2's own admission is himself, not the Plaintiff.

When the second circular dated 21st April 2000 (P23) was up on the notice board of the Southern College, SP2 had by then left the Southern College (he left on 31st March 2000). SP2 said he subsequently received a copy of P23 from his ex-colleague of Southern College i.e. one So Tang Heng.

SP2 testified that upon reading P23, he concluded that it referred to the Plaintiff. He proceeded to make a copy of it and gave it to the Plaintiff (para 21 Page 192 A.R.).

It is SP2's evidence that in view of P20 & P23, there is prejudice amongst students and teachers of Southern College

towards degrees from St. Clements University and Irish Business School. SP2 testified that the course content of students taking the Accounting Course had recently been amended. This would at some point result in Southern College and the two institutions competing for the same pool of university students to register for the degree programs of either the program designed by Southern College or that of the two institutions. In short, SP2 said that Southern College is a rival contender with the two institutions for the "patronage" of the students.

However this evidence too, is hearsay. SP2 testified that one Ms Tan Hui Chi (lecturer of Southern College) was responsible for the change in the course content and whose prejudice against the two institutions led to the note being put on P20 (See para 18 page 191 A.R.). But verifies this statement? No one.

Likewise for the second circular (P23) not a single witness was called forth to verify an otherwise conjectural opinion of SP2, which is exacerbated by hearsay.

Given the range of spectrum of meanings which an ordinary reader might attach to the words, would the words of SP2 come within the range necessary to impute defamation?

In other words, would SP2's testimony pass the test of it being the impression of reasonable or right-thinking people upon reading the impugned words?

In my view, it does not. My reasons are simply these.

Firstly, SP2 is not an independent witness. Although case laws do not suggest any bar to obtaining views of interested parties, his view cannot be said to be representative of the view of the ordinary man in the street. His value does not reflect those "right-thinking" people, simply because he is not one of them – for he is himself associated with the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff's company. It might be recalled that SP2 was made the local academic advisor to the Plaintiff (the Plaintiff being the local academic counselor) on matters which will assist the development of St. Clements University and L & G Consultant and Education Services joint degree program. (See para 9 witness statement page 189).

There is nothing in evidence to suggest that SP2 had severed his ties with the Plaintiff or the Plaintiff's company. SP2 has links with both the Plaintiff and St. Clements University, for he obtained his Doctor of Letters from St. Clements University after paying RM12,000 for it and professorship was conferred on him by St. Clements University.

SP2's strong connection with the Plaintiff and his company is clearly seen in evidence, when SP2 admitted that he conducted other courses for St. Clements University (like Business Management, Psycho-Philosophy) – and gave tutorials conducted by e-mail, telephone, fax and he occasionally met students on a one to one basis. For all that, he received payment from the

Plaintiff. (See page 133 A.R.). SP2 is inextricably linked to the Plaintiff.

In view of the foregoing can it therefore be said that SP2's opinion or impression of the impugned words are those of ordinary, right-thinking people? I think not.

Thus SP2's evidence is of little or no probative value to support the Plaintiff's claim.

The Plaintiff's one other witness was Loo Nic Kee (SP3). SP3 was a former student of Southern College. He had a pass in his Southern College Diploma and with a 500 word thesis, was awarded a BBA degree from St. Clements University. He obtained this through the Plaintiff. SP3's evidence was that the Plaintiff was the sole representative of St. Clements University and Irish Business School. SP3 also said that the Plaintiff had given talks in the college premises on this degree program. He said that lecturers of Southern College had referred students to the Plaintiff regarding applications for enrolment into the degree programs of the two institutions. SP3 went on to say that any reference to any unnamed person or organisation introducing St. Clements University and Irish Business School degree program in Southern College must refer only to the Plaintiff of L & G consultants and Education Services and no one else.

SP3 said that he happened to visit Southern College and after reading P20, formed the impression that LAN considers that

the validity, existence and quality of St. Clements University was doubtful.

It is noted that SP3 had not seen nor read P23. Apart from reading the note made in P20 and without the benefit of reading the contents of P23 for the full effect and impact of the impugned words, I find SP3's testimony on the meaning to be attached to the impugned words in P20 to be contrived and false therefore worthless, and is of no probative value.

What is the basis of SP3's construction that LAN was of the view that the validity, existence and quality of the two institutions were doubtful when he was not privy to P23? It defies logic. SP3's evidence certainly carries no weight and to my mind, should suffer the same fate as the evidence of SP2.

SP2's and SP3's evidence made up the total part of the Plaintiff's case. No one from the current student body or lecturers of Southern College were called to testify. No one, least of all the court, was appraised of their view and impression the two circulars P20 and P23 made on degrees offered by the two institutions and the impression they had if any, of the Plaintiff.

In other words the view of right-thinking and ordinary members of the public was not available. Since I find that the views of SP2 and SP3 cannot be said to represent the views of ordinary, right thinking members of the public (for reasons already stated), the Plaintiff's claim is not on solid ground.

An important aspect which seems to escape the learned judge is this. If at all SP2 and SP3 represent the view of right thinking or reasonable people, there is nothing in their testimony which indicate that the defamatory words had lowered the Plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking people.

All that SP2 said with regard to this aspect is that LAN's misgivings had caused HIM to be ridiculed by his colleagues in Southern College. He was more worried about the value now placed on his doctoral degree awarded by St. Clements University.

At no time did he testify (whether in his written statement nor in his evidence in court) that the defamatory words in P20 and P23 resulted in students and lecturers now to view the Plaintiff with suspicion, ridicule, hatred or contempt.

In fact the standing and self-worth and reputation of the Plaintiff did not feature at all in SP2's evidence. SP2 was more worried and concerned the impact this had on the worth and value of his own degree. He said nothing about the effect the impugned words had on the Plaintiff, as if indifferent to it.

The same can be said of SP3. Nary a thought was given by SP3 to anybody's estimation of the Plaintiff, in the light of LAN's circular. Likewise, SP3 was more consumed with worry about the value to be now placed on his degree from St. Clements University.

If both SP2 and SP3, as the ONLY witnesses to advance the Plaintiff's claim gave no evidence whatsoever as regard the impact the defamatory words had on the Plaintiff (their claims of ridicule or contempt by students and lecturers being hearsay) the Plaintiff has no leg to stand on at all and thus the first ingredient i.e. whether the impugned words are defamatory or otherwise, are not proven.

Publication

Insofar as the issue of publications is concerned, it is not in dispute that P20 and P23 were in fact published. Since the learned trial judge had correctly stated this position, I shall desist from deliberating this point.

Identification

To succeed in an action for defamation, the Plaintiff must not only prove that defamatory words were published, he must also identify that the person defamed refers to him. It is trite of course that the Plaintiff need not be referred to by name. The test is whether the Plaintiff may reasonably be understood to be referred to by the words (see Gatley on Libel and Slander (9th Edition) page 166).

A claimant such as the Plaintiff must identify himself as the subject of the defamatory material. Since the impugned words in P20 and P23 did not name the Plaintiff, the identification of the claimant can arise by virtue of the 'natural and ordinary' meaning of the words. As in cases of unnamed claimants, identification can

be made by innuendo. The claimant must prove by direct evidence or inference that there are readers who knew it refers to him since they have some particular knowledge to be able to identify him as such.

The test is whether reasonable readers generally or a reasonable reader with the particular knowledge would understand the statement to refer to the claimant. Mere conjecture that it might refer to the claimant is insufficient. (See 'Defamation' Law Procedure and Practice 3rd Edition by David Price and Korieh Duodu).

The question is whether or not the words are reasonably capable of being understood to refer to the claimant. The leading authority is **Knupffer v. London Express Newspapers Ltd [1944] AC 116** in which the Plaintiff was represented by the British branch of the Young Russia Party. The party numbered 2,000 and the British branch had 24 members. The allegation in a British newspaper was that the party was pro-Hitler, but there was no reference to any particular member in the article. The Court of Appeal held that the words were not capable of referring to the Plaintiff, as opposed to the party, which was upheld by the House of Lords.

In another case, **Riches v. News Group Newspapers [1986] QB 256**, the News of the World repeated various allegations of misconduct against "Banbury CID". Only one officer was named. There were twelve officers at Banbury CID, ten of

whom brought a claim for libel and were able to show that the allegations would have been understood to refer to them.

In the instant appeal, the impugned words in P23 were:-

> "… Few days ago, it was informed through telephone by a student's parent, Yian, that there are lecturers from this college joined with outside organization to introduce the 'degree' courses of St. Clements University and Irish Business School in Southern College."

The said circular P23 went on in the next paragraph, about LAN's notice pointing out that the validity, legality and quality of the two institutions were doubted.

Although the plaintiff has set out in the statement of claim the facts and circumstances which show that the words can reasonably be construed as referring to him, in my view it cannot be said that any person reading it would immediately understand the words to refer to him. (**Morgan v. Oldhams Press Ltd [1971] 2 All ER 1156**).

The Plaintiff argues that there are 'special facts' which would ensure that ordinary persons would understand the words to refer to him. The said 'special fact' relied on by the Plaintiff is this: that when he gave talks to students in Southern College, they knew that he was the sole representative of the two institutions.

Is this true? From the record the evidence that the Plaintiff is the sole representative of the two institutions came from the Plaintiff himself and his two witnesses SP2 and SP3. They also

alluded to the fact that most students and teachers of Southern College also knew of this fact. But as I had indicated earlier the veracity of this fact has not been determined. Whilst the Plaintiff kept harping on the fact that most students and lecturers of Southern College knew of it, in my view, hearsay evidence on this point is certainly not going to help the Plaintiff.

In as much as the impugned words refer to a determinate class i.e. lecturers from Southern College and this class is not large and disparate, the said special fact is not particular nor exclusive to the Plaintiff.

As Lord Atkin observed in Knupffer's case:

> "The only relevant rule is that in order to be actionable the defamatory words must be understood to be published of and concerning the plaintiff. It is irrelevant that the words are published of two or more persons if they are proved to be published of him, and it is irrelevant that the two or more persons are called by some generic or class name. There can be no law that a defamatory statement made of a firm, or trustees, or the tenants of a particular building is not actionable, if the words would reasonably be understood as published of each member of the firm or each trustee or each tenant. The reason why a libel published of a large or indeterminate number of persons described by some general name generally fails to be actionable is the difficulty of establishing that the plaintiff was, in fact, included in the defamatory statement, for the habit of making unfounded generalizations is ingrained in ill-educated or vulgar minds, or the words are occasionally intended to be a factious exaggeration."

So the test is:

Would reasonable persons understand the words to refer to the particular Plaintiff?

Factors to be considered in deciding this question are, as Lord Porter pointed out in Knupffer's case "*the size of the class, the generality of the charge and the extravagance of the accusations".*

The operative words are "lecturers from this college….". Who, then are lecturers from Southern College who had joined with an organization outside of the college to introduce the degree program of the two institutions?

As evidence had shown, the Plaintiff had NOT at any time, been employed by Southern College as a lecturer. The plain and obvious meaning of the impugned words would be a person who is on the board of teaching staff of Southern College. It refers to a defined class, i.e. lecturers of Southern College. How many lecturers in Southern College are there? And out of that group, how many of them are affiliated with an 'outside organization' to introduce the degree courses of the two institutions?

In this regard, it is interesting that SP2 in his witness statement at paragraph 22 said that the words "lecturers from this college" may or may not refer to him. He stated that this was because he left the college as lecturer on 31.3.2000. The said circular P23 was dated 21st April 2000 i.e. about three (3) weeks after SP2 left. It is also noted that there is at least one other lecturer in Southern College who was linked to the two institutions.

She is one Ms Lim Sai Koon who graduated from Irish Business School.

Both SP2 and Ms Lim had degrees from St. Clements University and Irish Business School respectively. Both SP2 and Ms Lim are lecturers in Southern College.

Whilst there is no evidence of Ms Lim being associated in any way with an 'outside organization' to promote degrees offered by the two institutions, SP2 was very much involved with an 'outside organisation' to introduce the said program of the two institutions.

Between them, it is very probable or likely that it could refer to SP2 rather than Ms Lim. But the fact remains that it could be either one of them.

Now let us consider the position of the Plaintiff and consequently his fate in this action.

What we have in evidence is that he is a promoter of the degree programs offered by the two institutions. He had given talks on at least two occasions (one in 1996 and one in 1997) to students of Southern College regarding the degree courses offered by the two institutions.

The Plaintiff claimed that many students had enrolled in the programs of the two institutions through him. As such he said, the students and teaching staff knew that he was the sole agent of the two institutions. But there is nothing in evidence to substantiate

this claim either by the two institutions or any other educational body. The Plaintiff's job is merely to promote the degree program of the two institutions. He is in short, an agent of the two institutions, introducing their programs to students.

He is not on the teaching staff of Southern College. He is certainly not a lecturer there. What he did there was merely to 'sell' the degree programs for commercial expedience. To equate a promoter of goods or services such as the Plaintiff, with that of a lecturer, lecturing and imparting knowledge to students is surely stretching it a bit.

In short, what Plaintiff does for a living, is far removed from what a lecturer does. So how could the Plaintiff imagine for a moment that he is the person referred to in P23?

The circumstances strongly indicate that the description in P23 fits SP2 accurately. Consider this. SP2 was a lecturer at Southern College until he resigned just three (3) weeks before P23 was written. SP2 in his testimony clearly testified that he helped introduce the degree programs of the two institutions. These programs are not those contained in Southern College's syllabus, thus it qualifies being construed as programs of an 'outside organisation'.

Logically, the use of the word 'outside' when referring to the organisation meant that the said organization bears no link or relationship with Southern College. Thus the words 'lecturer' from Southern College is understood to mean just that – that the person

referred to is one who is employed by Southern College. In this context it is SP2 who belongs or once belonged to the college. And when that word is tested against the word 'outside organization', it can only mean that it refers to SP2 or someone having the same qualification or attribute like him i.e. employed and on the payroll of Southern College having 'links' with an outside organization to introduce degrees of the two institutions.

In that context, it cannot refer to the Plaintiff who does not belong to Southern College. For otherwise, the word 'outside organisation' does not make sense; since the Plaintiff is already an outsider, as it were.

Is this interpretation correct? Is the person someone who lectures in the college and has links or is affiliated with an 'outside organization' to introduce the said degrees?

Consider this. Whilst still a lecturer at Southern College, SP2 was asked by St. Clements University by letter dated 3rd October 1997 to be an honorary local academic advisor to L & G Consultants and Education Services. (See paragraph 9 witness statement page 189 A.R.).

SP2 stated that his main duty is to advise the Plaintiff (as St. Clements University local academic counselor) on matters which will assist the development of St. Clements University/L & G Consultants and Education Services joint degree program. Thus the word 'outside organisation' could refer to L & G Consultants and Education Services Ltd or it could well refer to St. Clements

University itself. From all accounts therefore, SP2 definitely has a stronger and better claim than the Plaintiff to be the person referred to in P23.

The question is – what then gave the Plaintiff the idea that the impugned words refer to him and that he has been maligned? There is no reason for him to imagine himself to be the intended object of the impugned words, since it is unclear who, among the "lecturers in this college" is the villain, when the Plaintiff cannot even pretend to be <u>one</u> of the lecturers to begin with.

On those grounds, I find that the Plaintiff's delusional stance should not influence what is clear – that the plaintiff has failed to prove that he is the subject of the alleged defamation.

Enough said. I am clearly of the view that the Plaintiff has failed to prove two of the most important ingredient of his claim i.e. that the statement or impugned words (in P20 and P23) -

(i) is defamatory and

(ii) refers to him.

This naturally means that the Defendant's defences do not arise. However it behoves me to make an observation on the approach taken by the learned trial judge in dealing with this action.

After having found that the Plaintiff had proven his claim of defamation, the learned trial judge proceeded to consider the Defendant's defence of justification.

In so doing what emerged were instances of misdirection by the learned judge.

In concluding that the Plaintiff's submission is 'meritable', the learned trial judge made erroneous findings of facts, leading to misdirections in law.

Firstly the learned trial judge had presumed without more, as a matter of fact, that St. Clements University, UK and Irish Business School exist as universities, conducting tuition of acceptable standard and awarding university degrees. Thus the learned trial judge had proceeded upon the presumption that St. Clements University, UK and Irish Business School are institutions of higher learning and that their existence, legality and academic quality were not in doubt.

Obviously the trial judge was unable to discern the truth – that St. Clements University is a company registered in Turks and Caicos Island and Irish Business School is only a registered name.

Secondly whilst the Defendant admitted that to say that St. Clements University is under Irish Business School as written in the Note in P20 is incorrect, the learned trial judge failed to see that this was jotted down in P20 only after the Defendant obtained oral information of this fact from the British Council. Although this

was done before investigations were made, the Defendant had categorically stated at page 149 A.R. that:

> "Ya, telah terima pengesahan lisan dari British Council bila nota dicatitkan."

The Defendant's testimony above was not challenged by the Plaintiff.

The learned trial judge glossed over the fact. He found that the note juxtaposed with the LAN circular which doubted the validity, existence and quality of three totally unrelated but similar sounding names of universities located in similar places clearly intended to imply by innuendo that the validity, existence and quality of St. Clements University and Irish Business School was also doubted by LAN and confirmed by the British Council. If the learned trial judge believed that the British Council holds the above view, then by necessary implication, the Defendant's alleged defamatory words are true, and therefore justified. Yet the learned trial judge later, held otherwise.

The learned trial judge's misdirection continued in the latter part of his judgment. At page 32, A.R. he stated that:

> "… In 1999 when the British Council reported to LAN on St. George University International (established in Turks and Caicos Islands) it must have also known of St. Clements University established in the same place as St. Clements University was in existence since 1995. The fact that the British Council did not mention St. Clements University to LAN because there had been nothing adverse about it."

The learned trial judge's reasoning above is baffling. It is almost perverse. In the first place, there is nowhere in evidence that the British Council reported to LAN on St. George University International. In the second place, it is highly presumptuous for the learned trial judge to blithely state that because St. George University International is established on Turks and Caicos Island, then LAN must have also known of St. Clements University since it is also established in the same place (Turks and Caicos Island). For the learned trial judge to carry on in the same vein – that the British Council did not mention St. Clements University to LAN because nothing adverse was reported about it, is surely preposterous on account of it being both untrue and speculative.

How the learned trial judge arrived at this conclusion is completely beyond me. In this regard, the learned trial judge had clearly misdirected himself.

Thirdly, the learned trial judge proceeded to find that the Defendant was actuated with express malice when the note in P20 and P23 were drawn up and circulated to students.

This is how the learned trial judge expressed this point: page 37 A.R.:-

> "… SP2 (Plaintiff's 2nd witnesses) in para 16 and 17 confirms this, that Bachelor of Business Administration of St. Clements University and Irish Business School in which student took to get exemptions from AIA became a competitor to the Defendant's Commerce Department which was promoting its students to sit for the ACCA examination….

> From the above it cannot be disputed that the dominant motive of the Defendant in putting this note to the LAN circular and its own letter dated 21.4.2000 and circulating to its students was made with the intention of discrediting the two (2) universities promoted by the Plaintiff. This is express malice."

From the above passage, clearly the learned trial judge seems to have a penchant for all things hearsay, speculative and conjectural; for, where is the evidence of any of the dastardly motive attributed to the Defendant?

There is no evidence adduced by the Plaintiff to show for instance, that the college syllabus or curriculum which shows the changes made in the accounting department, rendering this new program in competition with the Defendant's program. There is no evidence by the Plaintiff for example that this change had indeed taken place and approved in a meeting of the Board. There is no minutes of such meeting for instance. Neither is there any evidence adduced that the Defendant had felt threatened by the competition – through its conduct or its action. Nothing of that sort happened or was adduced as evidence.

In the absence of all material facts to prove this allegation, the learned trial judge's finding is irrelevant. He has clearly misdirected himself. In the stark absence of conclusive evidence that each and every ingredient of the Plaintiff's claim had been proven, it is surely a misdirection on the learned trial judge's part to make erroneous findings of fact leading to misdirection in law.

Arising from this, the learned trial judge shifted the burden on to the Defendant. Naturally the judge focused his mind on the defences put up by the Defendant.

I should not now concern myself with the defences since I had found that the Plaintiff had failed in his claim. The burden of proof had not shifted to the Defendant.

However I believe that for good measure, there is much to be said for putting the whole matter in perspective. Thus let us consider the facts.

The Defendant put up two grounds of defence i.e. the defence of justification and fair comment. First of all, it is true that a staff of the Defendant put up the Note in P20. But he said that at the time of putting that note, he had obtained an oral confirmation from British Council of this fact (that St. Clements University was under Irish Business School). It was later, in the course of an investigation that he found out that this fact is not correct. But at the time the note was put up be believed it to be true. The Defendant was not challenged on this point.

The learned trial judge cited several authorities such as **Institute of Commercial Management United Kingdom v. New Straits Times [1993] 1 MLJ 408, and Abdul Rahman Talib v. Seenivasagam & Anor [1966] 2 MLJ 66** which said that justification is a complete defence to libel if the defamatory imputation is true or that the material statements in the libel are true.

It is banal to state that it is the question of imputation that is material in this case. Imputation here refers to the truth of the statement alleged to be defamatory not to the identity of the person said to have made the statement.

The question one might ask is: Is the statement of the defence that the existence, legality and academic quality of St. Clements University and Irish Business School are in doubt, in fact and in substance, true?

The learned trial judge took a narrow approach. He said that in order to succeed on their plea of justification, the Defendant must prove that their statement on the note to the LAN circular and paragraph 1 and 2 of P23 are true. He said that the truth that must be proven by the Defendant is that the LAN circular dated 20th August 1999 (P20) states that St. Clements University and Irish Business School's legality, existence and academic quality are in doubt.

The learned trial judge had clearly missed the point. It is important to distinguish what the law requires to be proven and what the learned trial judge believes should be proven.

Firstly it is true that LAN did not, either in P20 or in P23, question the validity, existence and academic quality of the two institutions.

But it is true and is a fact that the validity, existence and academic quality of the two institutions are in doubt.

The truth of the Defendant's imputation above is manifest in the testimony of Defendant's witnesses.

The first direct evidence came from Puan Zainun bt Ahmad (DW3), a senior corporate manager of LAN. She testified that LAN is responsible for evaluating and assessing the quality control of private higher educational institutions in Malaysia and also those of foreign higher educational institutions intending their degrees to be recognised in Malaysia. Puan Zainun testified that:-

(i) Both St. Clements University and Irish Business School are not recognised institutions of higher learning. She observed that:
"Saya dapati ijazah dari kedua-dua institusi tersebut adalah diragui kerana St. Clements University sebenarnya cuma Syarikat di Turks dan Caicos Island dan bukannya sebuah universiti yang sahih."

(ii) Private higher educational intuitions are not allowed to conduct courses 100% on line;

(iii) Private higher educational institutions which intend to conduct courses in Malaysia are required to apply to LAN for course evaluation and obtain prior approval from LAN before being allowed to offer courses.

In this regard, there is no evidence adduced by the Plaintiff whether prior approval from LAN was obtained in relation to courses offered by St. Clements University and Irish Business School.

The other defence witness was one Gerald John Liston (DW 1), Director of the British Council who enjoys diplomatic immunity. He waived it to give evidence on the Defendant's behalf. He testified that –

(i) St. Clements University and Irish Business School are not listed in the list of educational institutions recognised in the United Kingdom.

(ii) British Council only provided accommodation and invigilation services for any examination that is conducted in Malaysia. It <u>does not give recognition</u> to the degree or course, invigilated.

Further evidence of justification/truth was given by Dr. Ariff Kassim, director of Enforcement of the Private Higher Education Department (a Registrar of Private Higher Education's Institution) under Section 3(2) of the Private Higher Educational Institution Act 1996 (PHEI Act), who testified that:-

(i) The Plaintiff had committed offences under the said Act in issuing misleading advertisement with false contents;

(ii) The Respondent had committed offences in collecting thousands of ringgit from students and issuing degrees from private institutions which had no permission to conduct any higher private educational course in Malaysia;

(iii) The above act of the Plaintiff renders him liable to prosecution under Section 75 of the PHEI Act. The

PHEI Act regulates the conduct of all individual and institutions which consider themselves private high educational institution in Malaysia including those purporting to provide 'distance' education.

The matter is compounded when the Plaintiff's solicitors themselves received a reply on 20th December 2001 from the Embassy of Ireland in response to their letter, stating that:-

> "I wish to confirm that the Irish Business School is not recognized by the Department of Education and Services of Ireland as an educational body."

Even the Public Services Department (PSD) or (JPA) Malaysia had something to say. According to its letter dated 12th June 2000 addressed to the Defendant, the degree offered by St. Clements University in –

(a) Bachelor of Accounting
(b) Bachelor of Business
(c) Bachelor of Business Administration
(d) Bachelor of Business Management
(e) Bachelor of Commerce
(f) Bachelor of Arts in Professional Studies
(g) Bachelor of Computing

are not recognised by the Government for purposes of appointment to the Civil Service. The recognition by PSD on St. Clements University and Irish Business School's post graduate

degrees is dependent upon the recognition by PSD, of the basic degree first had and obtained by the holder.

The significance of these witnesses' testimony, was clearly lost on the learned trial judge. The learned trial judge had failed to consider Dr. Ariff Kassim's testimony who testified that in view of the provision of the PHEI Act the Plaintiff could be regarded as having issued false information and misleading advertisement. Though this is only an opinion, regard must be had to it, coming as it were from the Director himself.

The learned trial judge took an equally simplistic approach as regards the evidence of Puan Zainun DW3. The learned trial judge ignored the significant portion of her evidence but placed emphasis on her inconsequential view that at the time of the LAN circular in 1999, LAN had not even heard of these two institutions and that she only obtained information regarding them after she received a subpoena in 2003 to attend the trial.

This, and the learned trial judge's disregard for the testimony of the Director of the British Council and letter from PSD, meant only one thing – that the learned trial judge had failed to critically evaluate the evidence before him. The fact the Plaintiff had failed to produce any evidence at all to establish the existence, legality and academic quality of the two institutions (matters which is specifically within the knowledge of the Plaintiff) should have been critically considered by the learned trial judge.

A minor yet significant point not given weight to by the learned trial judge relates to the fact that the Plaintiff had asked the Defendant to withdraw the impugned words and to apologise to the Plaintiff. The Defendant had done so. In the face of the said withdrawal and apology by the Defendant, the demand for further apologies and sum of RM980,000.00 by the Plaintiff were unjustified and could ironically, be said to be actuated by malice.

In fact, in view of the evidence before me, I find that even though the burden had not shifted to the Defendant, the defence of justification would easily come to roost. On the totality of evidence, my view is that the absence of academic quality of both St. Clements University and Irish Business School is established. Their validity and existence are clearly in doubt.

As for the defence of fair comment, it must be said at the outset that generally, to qualify, the Defendant must establish that:

(i) the statement must be comment and not fact;

(ii) the comment must have a sufficient factual basis (i.e. the comment must be based on facts which are themselves sufficiently true);

(iii) the comment must be one which an honest person could hold. This is an objective test, but should not be confused with reasonableness.

(iv) the subject matter of the comment must be of public interest.

The Defendant must prove all four tests and if successful, there is nothing more for him to do, unless the Plaintiff proves that the comment was maliciously published. In this sense, malice means that the Defendant did not honestly believe in the opinion he was expressing. If the Defendant honestly believes the opinion, an improper motive for publishing a defamatory opinion will not amount to malice.

The Defendant made his comment in the Note in P20 and in P23. It is undisputed that the Defendant had been orally informed by British Council of the fact that St. Clements University was under Irish Business. The Plaintiff did not at any time challenged this part of the Defendant's testimony. It was only later, when the Defendant was informed otherwise that the Defendant admitted that that fact was untrue.

But what is crucial is at the time of his comment he honestly believes it to be true. The Plaintiff in this connection failed to establish that the Defendant was actuated by malice when he made the said comment.

Case laws have indicated that the subject matter of the comment must be a matter of legitimate public interest. In **London Artist v. Littler (1969) 2 QD 375**, Lord Denning observed that:-

> "Whenever a matter is such as to affect people at large, so that they may be legitimately interested in, or concerned at what is going on or what may happen to

> them or others: then it is a matter of public interest on which everyone is entitled to make fair comment."

The Defendant honestly believed that as the principal of Southern College he would be failing in his duty if he were to ignore the risk students might fall into if he did not warn them. The Defendant felt he owed a duty to protect students from any dubious representation.

In fact his worst fears were realized when the evidence of PW1, DW3, DW1, the officer for Irish Embassy and officer from PSD provided disquieting evidence on the actual position and standing of the two institutions. The Defendant had reason to believe that the legality, existence and academic quality of the two institutions were in doubt. As had been shown and not rebutted by the Plaintiff, the circular itself (P23) indicated that the Defendant had received a complaint from a parent regarding the marketing of degree program from the two institutions. So where is the malice as alluded to by the Plaintiff?

As observed in a textbook, "Libel and Slander" by Carter-Ruck (4th Edition page 131):-

> "No action will succeed without proof of express malice in respect of a statement made by a person in the performance of a legal, moral or social duty to a person who has a corresponding interest in receiving such statement."

In view of the true facts about the two institutions which were admitted during trial there is no doubt that the students and lecturers to whom the Note in P20 and Circular (P23) were

directed to had a corresponding interest to be alerted that the legality, existence and academic quality of “St. Clements University UK” and “Irish Business School” are in doubt.

It might be argued by the Plaintiff that the impugned words in P20 and P23 are defamatory of him, since even if the Defendant were successful in proving his defence of justification the truth of the statement came about only <u>after</u> the allegation were made.

However it must not be lost sight of that the purpose of the civil laws is to compensate a claimant, not to punish a defendant. Thus if a malicious defendant who publishes allegations believing them to be wholly false, solely with the intention of injuring the claimant, will successfully defend that claim if it emerges that he has accidentally stumbled upon the truth. (See page 55 ‘Defamation Law, Procedures and Practice 3rd Edition by David Price and Korieh Duodu). And even if the statement is untrue at the date of publication, subsequent misconduct of the claimant before the claim is tried may be relied on by the defendant to prove the truth of the publication (<u>**Cohen v. Daily Telegraph Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 916**</u>).

So is the position in this appeal. Much as the Defendant argues that he need not put up any defences at all, be it justification or fair comment since the Plaintiff had not discharged its own burden, the Defendant will still be able to secure judgment in his favour since he is able to show that the publication is ‘substantially’ true or as it was put by Burrough J. in <u>**Edwards v.**</u>

<u>Bell [1824] 1 Bing. 403</u>, "*as much must be justified as meets the sting of the charge*."

Where there are errors in the publication the question of whether the substance or the sting has been proved is a question of judgment which will depend on the fact of the case. Where the errors are minor or technical, they will be disregarded for otherwise the Plaintiff would be vindicated on an entirely minor basis.

Our Section 8 of the Defamation Act 1957 provides for the defence of justification. Section 8 read:

> "In an action for libel or slander in respect of words containing two or more distinct charges against the Plaintiff a defence of justification shall not fall by reason only that the truth of every charge is not proved if the words not proved to be true do not materially injure the Plaintiff's reputation having regard to the truth of the remaining charges."

In other words a purposive approach is taken in interpreting Section 8 – when for a defence of justification to be upheld, it is not necessary to prove the truth of every word in the statement said to be defamatory. What is relevant is actually the truth of the imputation of the overall statement. It follows therefore that the identity of the maker of the statement is immaterial to the defence of justification. This is the correct interpretation because if the statement were in substance and in fact false, it would still be defamatory even if LAN did make a false statement and was repeated by the Defendant. Thus the issue is not whether LAN did

make the statement but whether in substance and in fact the imputation of the statement were true.

Clearly the totality of evidence points to the Defendant having proven justification and truth of the sting of the impugned words in P20 and P23.

For having concluded otherwise, the learned trial judge had obviously failed to critically evaluate the evidence before him and consequently he made wrong findings of fact leading to a misdirection.

In the light of the above, I find that the learned trial judge had erred in awarding the Plaintiff the sum of RM980,000.00 as special damages, when the Plaintiff had led no evidence on special damages. The rule is explicit.

Special damages must be pleaded or proved. Merely pleading special damages without more is unacceptable. Thus the award of special damages of RM980,000.00 must fail. As for awarding the Plaintiff the amount of RM50,000.00 for aggravated damages the learned trial judge had grossly erred in not appreciating the evidence where the Defendant had expressly apologised within seven (7) days as requested by the Plaintiff. Thus this head of damages should also fail.

The learned trial judge also erred in assessing general damages. This he did by computing the loss of income in 1998 and the drop in income at a later date, when there was no

evidence to substantiate this. In any case, loss of income is special damages, not general damages (for which the learned judge had already awarded RM980,000.00 separately).

In the circumstances I find that the error committed in the court below justifies appellate intervention. Thus I would allow this appeal with costs here and below and the High Court decision is set aside. Deposit to be refunded to the Defendant.

Dated this day 13th March 2009

(DATUK ZAINUN BINTI ALI)
Judge
Court of Appeal
Malaysia.

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