DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA DI PUTRAJAYA

(BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN)

RAYUAN SIVIL NO. J-03 -16-2007

ANTARA

LOW NAM HUI & SONS SDN. BHD. … PERAYU
(No. Syarikat: 10067-V)

DAN

HUANG YAN TEO … RESPONDEN

[Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Di Johor Bahru
Guaman Sivil No. 22-121-2005 (1)

Antara

Huang Yan Teo … Plaintif

Dan

Low Nam Hui & Sons Sdn. Bhd.
(Syarikat No. 10067-V) … Defendan]

Coram:

Mokhtar Sidin, J.C.A.
Mohd Ghazali Mohd Yusoff, J.C.A.
Low Hop Bing, J.C.A.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The Application

This is an application of the Appellant vide Notice of Motion dated 9-5-2007 (Enclosure 6a) for an order to stay the execution of the order of the learned Judge made on 25-1-2007 pending appeal to the Court of Appeal. The application is supported by the affidavit of Mr. Low Kueck Shin affirmed on 8-5-2007 (Enclosure 6b), and opposed by the affidavit of the Respondent Mr. Huang Yan Teo affirmed on 26-6-2007, to which the Appellant filed an affidavit in reply also affirmed by Mr. Low on 9-7-2007.

Background facts

The Appellant, Low Nam Hui & Sons Sdn. Bhd., is a company incorporated in Malaysia. The Respondent was an accountant previously employed by the Appellant. The dispute herein arose from a Consultancy Agreement (Exhibit L 2) dated 31-12-1999 ("the said Agreement") which the Respondent and six other parties (who were collectively referred to as "the Consultants" in the said Agreement) of the one part and the Appellant of the other part had entered into on 31-12-1999 for the sole purpose of listing the shares ("the listing") of the financially distressed company known as Sportma Corporation Berhad and for this purpose the Appellant and the

six other parties offered (in Recital 1 of the said Agreement) "their expertise and services to the Company for obtaining all the relevant approvals for the purpose of reverse take-over exercise and listing of the shares of the PLC in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (hereinafter called "the said Approvals"), subject to and in accordance with the conditions stated in the said Agreement. A perusal of this Agreement shows that under clause 4, the seven consultants (including the Respondent) "shall procure and/or obtain the said Approvals in writing which result into the successful listing of the shares". If they shall fail to procure the listing by 17-8-2000 or the extended date of 31-12-2001, clause 4 of the said Agreement provides that the said Agreement shall be treated as null and void. Clause 6 makes reference to the termination of the said Agreement by lapse of time under clause 4 above. It was not in dispute that by the extended date on 31-12-2001, the said Approvals and the listing were not procured by the Consultants. We were informed by counsel that, when the Respondent filed his claim in March 2005, the other six parties had not filed any claim against the Appellant under the said Agreement. In his statement of claim and summons in chambers for summary judgment under Order 14 of the Rules of the High Court 1980, the Respondent claims the following against the Appellant:

(a) RM3,250,000-00 as the consultancy fees pursuant to the said Agreement dated 31-12-1999.

(b) RM162,500-00 as the 5% service tax.

(c) As substitution for (a) above, the Appellant to pay the Respondent the said consultancy fees in kind in shares of Harn Len Corporation Berhad of equal value, according to the current market value.

(d) Interest at 8% p.a. on the sum of RM3,250,000-00 from the date of claim (26-8-2003) to the full payment of the said sum.

On 6-1-2006 the learned Senior Assistant Registrar gave, under Order 14 of the Rules of the High Court 1980, summary judgment in favour of the Respondent as prayed, and the Appellant's application for stay of execution of her order pending appeal to the Judge in Chambers was also dismissed by her. Being dissatisfied, the Appellant appealed to the Judge in Chambers against her summary judgment. The learned Judge dismissed the Appellant's appeal to him with costs on 25-1-2007. On 2-2-2007, the Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal against his order and thereafter applied to him for stay by summons in chambers supported by affidavit. Its application was opposed by the Respondent, and on 7-5-2007, the learned Judge dismissed the Appellant's application for stay with costs. In order to

prevent execution of the order of the learned Judge and to maintain the status quo, the Appellant made the present application to the Court of Appeal. At the time of hearing of this application before us, the grounds of judgments of the learned Judge dismissing the Appellant's appeal and the stay application were not available.

Before us, learned counsel for the Appellant, Dr. Wong Kim Fatt (assisted by Mr. Wong Boon Lee), contended that this was a case where judgment should not have been given summarily without a full trial on conflicting affidavit evidence as there were triable issues of fact and law. He contended that the Respondent had failed to procure the listing by the extended date of 31-12-2001 and that the listing on or about 25-7-2003 of Harn Len Corporation Berhad was procured by the sole effort of the Appellant, not the effort of the Respondent. Dr. Wong further contended that granting a stay would not render the judgment nugatory as the Appellant was financially sound and would be able to pay the judgment sum in the event it lost the appeal.

Learned counsel for the Respondent, Mr. Tan Hee Soon, in objecting to the application, contended that there were no triable issues and that merit of the case was not a ground for stay. He contended that the delay in the

listing was caused by the Appellant. He further contended that there were no special circumstances to justify a stay, citing the Federal Court case of *Kosma Palm Oil Mill Sdn. Bhd. & Ors*. v. *Koperasi Serbausaha Marmur Bhd.* [2004] 1 MLJ 257, where the facts are different from those of this case. We would now address briefly the issues of merit of the Appellant's case and whether there are special circumstances to justify a stay of the order of the learned Judge.

Merit

As the granting or refusing of a stay is in the unfettered discretion of the court, we are entitled to take all relevant factors into consideration, such as the competing interests of the parties, the merit of the Appellant's application, and whether there are triable issues in a case such as the present one where the Senior Assistant Registrar gave summary judgment against the Appellant under an Order 14 application without a full trial and, as stated before, the appeal to the Judge in Chambers was dismissed with costs by the learned Judge who had also dismissed with costs the Appellant's application for stay.

We agree with the judgment of V.C. George J. (as he then was) in *Hong Leong Finance Bhd.* v. *Hong Hoi Weng & Ors*. [1987] 2 MLJ 377 that

in an application for stay, a distinction must be drawn between a case summarily decided and one decided after a full trial and enquiry. In a summary judgment case decided by a senior assistant registrar or a deputy registrar, a stay of execution of the order should normally be granted pending appeal to the judge in chambers if it can be shown that there are triable issues or that the appellant will probably succeed in the appeal. It is pertinent to note what the learned Judge said at p. 379:

> "In my view reliance on *Syarikat Berpakat* and on *Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn. Bhd.* (and on the cases cited in those judgments referred to therein) in respect of an application for stay pending appeal from the exercise of summary jurisdiction given by O. 14 by a Senior Assistant Registrar is misconceived.
>
> An analysis of the judgments in those two cases and of the judgments cited therein shows that it would be more correct to state the rule as follows: Where judgment is entered after a full trial of the issues (or in the case of an appeal, after a full hearing thereof) the general rule is that stay of execution pending appeal (or where it applies, further appeal) will not be granted unless there are special circumstances."

We would state that in a case involving summary judgment, merit of the appeal is an important factor for consideration. The statutes or the rules of courts do not prohibit the courts from taking into consideration the merit of the application or the appeal in deciding whether or not to grant a stay and whether to impose any conditions on the stay which the courts consider to be reasonable. If merit is irrelevant, then injustice may be caused to an

appellant/applicant in a case where the registrar or the judge decides the summary application arbitrarily or where they have wholly failed to consider the facts and law clearly favouring the appellant/applicant.

A case on merit in the appeal for consideration is seen in *See Teow Guan* v. *Kian Joo Holdings Sdn. Bhd.* [1995] 3 MLJ 598 where Gopal Sri Ram JCA said at p. 611:

> "Take this very case. It is clear from the authorities that the substantive appeal, based upon a single point of interpretation, lacks all merit and is doomed to failure. In this state of affairs, would it be a proper exercise of discretion to permit a stay and cause a delay in the prosecution of the petition? I think not. Apart from the absence of merits, there are other reasons as well."

Another case of merit in the appeal, i.e. "a very powerful appeal", for granting a stay is seen in the Court of Appeal case of *Penang Port Commission* v. *Kanawangi s/o Seperumaniam* [1996] 3 MLJ 427, where Mahadev Shankar JCA said at p. 435:

> "The Appellant, in our view, had a very powerful appeal to argue on the measure of damages the Respondent was entitled to recover. The question as to whether the High Court could appoint him to the post he claimed to be qualified for was another issue. In all the circumstances, it was clear to us that there was a very real risk that the appeal would be wholly nugatory if we did not intercede. We therefore dismissed the Respondent's application and made an order in terms of the Appellant's application."

A more recent case similar to the present one is *Hong Kong Bank Malaysia Bhd.* v. *Wexcel Holdings Sdn. Bhd. & Ors.* [2005] 2 MLJ 616, where the plaintiff had obtained summary judgment. Abdul Malik Ishak J. (now JCA), in considering the stay application pending appeal to the Court of Appeal, took into account that the defendants had a meritorious defence and that there were triable issues, and granted a stay of the order of his immediate predecessor.

Special circumstances

In an application for stay of an order after a full trial pending appeal, the general rule is that the appellant/applicant must show that there are special circumstances justifying a stay. It is often said that the courts will not deprive a successful litigant of the fruits of his litigation after a full trial, and will not grant a stay unless special circumstances are shown by the unsuccessful party who is appealing to a higher court against the relevant order. Thus in the Singapore case of *Lee Kuan Yew* v. *Jeyaretnam JB* [1991] 1 MLJ 83 judgment was given against the defendant after a full trial and Yong Pung How J. (as he then was) dismissed the application for stay of execution of the order pending appeal because the defendant had failed to show any special circumstances.

The statutes or the rules of court do not define what constitutes a special circumstance. This is left practically to the opinion and judicial discretion of the presiding judges. In a nutshell, a special circumstance must mean something out of the ordinary or something unusual. The category of special circumstances can never be limited or closed, as from time to time and case to case different and various factors may be accepted as special circumstances. The judge sitting alone or the judges of an appellate court must decide, on the available evidence disclosed in the competing affidavits before him or them, whether there are special circumstances relating to the enforcement of the order or judgment in order to justify a stay of the order or judgment appealed against, and on what terms, if any, which are reasonable. There may be a situation in which one single factor by itself will not constitute a special circumstance. Depending on the facts of the case, there may also be a situation in which merit of the appeal and one or more factors considered together may amount to a special circumstance justifying a stay. The judge will have to balance the competing interests of the parties. Where the applicant can show that there is no risk that he will dispose of his assets pending appeal, the discretion is to grant a stay. In *Kerajaan Malaysia* v. *Jasanusa Sdn. Bhd.* [1995] 1 MLJ 105, the Federal Court refused to interfere with the discretion of the judge to extend the order of stay. In *Kosma Palm*

Oil Mill Sdn. Bhd. v. *Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd*. [2004] 1 MLJ 257, the Federal Court refused a stay as the applicants failed to establish special circumstances. It is pertinent to note what Augustine Paul JCA (as he then was), in delivering the judgment of the Federal Court in the *Kosma Palm Oil* case said of special circumstances and of nugatoriness with reference to the *See Teow Guan* case, at p. 268:

> "It is therefore clear beyond doubt that there are many factors that may constitute special circumstances and the fact that an appeal would be rendered nugatory if stay was refused is the most common one. It is an example of special circumstances. In other words, special circumstances is the genus of which nugatoriness is a species. If it has been shown that an appeal would be rendered nugatory if stay was refused what it means is that a special circumstance has been established. Thus, they cannot be treated as separate heads and one cannot be an alternative to the other. Neither can one be accepted or rejected in favour of the other as they are inter-related. *See Teow Guan & Ors.* v. *Kian Foo Holdings Sdn. Bhd. & Or*s. could have withstood scrutiny if it had merely referred to nugatoriness without rejecting special circumstances. As nugatoriness is a species of special circumstances, a mere reference to it is sufficient to convey the correct legal impression. Any attempt to restrict the grant of a stay to nugatoriness, quite apart from its impropriety, will severely restrict the grounds on which an application may rely. Learned counsel for the applicants is therefore wrong in submitting that the nugatory approach is not a matter for consideration in this case as what is relevant is only the special circumstances. He would have been correct if he had said that he was not relying on nugatoriness but on some other species of special circumstances."

Granting of stay

An appeal by itself does not operate as a stay of execution of the order appealed against. The appellant must therefore make an application to the Court of Appeal supported by affidavit evidence, i.e. after the High Court judge has dismissed the stay application. The Court, in hearing such an application has the discretion whether to grant or refuse a stay of execution. That discretion must always be exercised judicially having proper regard to the circumstances and facts of each particular case. Rule 13 of the Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994 offers no guideline nor impose any fetters on the Court's discretion. Rule 13 reads: "An appeal shall not operate as a stay of execution of proceedings under the decision appealed from unless the High Court or the Court so orders and no intermediate act or proceeding shall be invalidated except so far as the Court may direct". In this regard, the Court of Appeal, in the exercise of its judicial discretion, is entitled to consider all the relevant factors disclosed in the competing affidavits before deciding whether or not to grant a stay.

The onus lies on the applicant to show special circumstances justifying a stay. He must satisfy the court on affidavit evidence on a balance of probabilities that there are special circumstances relating to the execution or enforcement of the order or judgment to justify a stay. Thus in

Kerajaan Malaysia v. *Dato' Hj. Ghani Gilong* [1995] 2 MLJ 119, Edgar Joseph Jr. FCJ, in delivering the judgment of the Federal Court and disagreeing with the Judge who granted a stay, said at p. 129:

> "We noted, that in the instant appeal, there was no formal application for stay supported by an affidavit affirmed by the taxpayer or his duly authorized agent, alleging special circumstances to justify the making of the order for stay. In other words, although the onus was upon the taxpayer to demonstrate special circumstances justifying a stay, there was no material upon which the Judge could have granted the order for a stay."

The case before us

In the case before us, the Appellant in its defence (paragraphs 4 and 6) has seriously disputed the claim of the Respondent, who nevertheless maintained that he had fulfilled his undertaking, notwithstanding the listing was procured well beyond the extended date of 31-12-2001, i.e. on or about 25-7-2003. The Appellant contended that, as the Respondent had failed to obtain all the relevant approvals from the relevant authorities and to procure the listing within the stipulated time, he had not fulfilled his promise or the condition precedent and was therefore not entitled to receive any fees or payment for his failure. The Respondent contended in paragraph 2 of his Reply that the delay for the listing was caused by the failure of the Appellant to satisfy the conditions imposed by the authorities. Directly related to this

issue of failure to procure the listing by the stipulated extended date of 31-12-2001 is another issue on the serious dispute between the parties, i.e. the Respondent disputed the claim of the Appellant that, after the extended deadline of 31-12-2001, the Appellant had obtained solely on its own efforts the listing of the shares of Harn Len Corporation Berhad on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (now Bursa Malaysia).

Without deciding on the merit of the case proper, we clearly are of the view that the above two issues are triable issues of fact and are central to the dispute between the two parties. These two issues can only be resolved at the full trial, where the judge has the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses and evaluating their credibility and the oral and documentary evidence. This cannot be achieved fairly on conflicting affidavit evidence in this case in an Order 14 summary judgment application. Related to these issues of fact is the issue of law as to the effects of sections 33 and 56 of the Contracts Act 1950 and relevant authorities such as the Court of Appeal case of *Choo Chin Thye* v. *Concrete Engineering Products Bhd.* [2005] 4 MLJ 14. These require proper consideration at the trial.

In *Alexander* v. *Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd.* (1985 – 1986) 10 ACLR 42, at p. 50 where Kirby P, applying a flexible practical rule for granting a stay, said:

> "In our opinion it is not necessary for the grant of a stay that special or exceptional circumstances should be made out. It is sufficient that the applicant for the stay demonstrates a reason or an appropriate case to warrant the exercise of discretion in his favour."

We came to the conclusion that the Appellant, on these issues of fact and law alone, had made out an appropriate case for stay, and we therefore on 18-7-2007 granted an order for stay of execution of the order of the learned Judge until the hearing and disposal of the Appellant's appeal in this Court.

We may now briefly address the issue raised by learned counsel for the Respondent that the Appellant had failed to show special circumstances to justify a stay. The nugatory factor forms a very important part of special circumstances. If the Appellant must show special circumstances, we will apply the nugatory approach as being the most appropriate approach in the circumstances of this case, i.e. whether the judgment would be rendered nugatory if we were to grant a stay pending appeal. In his affidavit of 9-7-2007, Mr. Low Kueck Shin, a director of the Appellant company, had

affirmed the Appellant's substantial assets and that the Appellant was of sound financial standing and would be able to satisfy the judgment sum if it eventually failed in the appeal. He had also affirmed that if a stay was not granted and if the huge sum of money was paid to the Respondent, an accountant aged 61 years, the Respondent would not be able to repay this sum with interest to the Appellant in the event that its appeal was successful. There was no credible evidence in rebuttal by the Respondent. At this juncture it may be relevant for us to refer to the judgment (cited with approval by the Federal Court in the *Kosma Palm Oil* case) of Abdul Malik Ishak J. (as he then was) in *Wu Shu Chen (Sole Executrix of the estate of Goh Keng How, deceased & Anor.)* [1996] 2 CLJ 353 where the learned Judge said at 356:

> "The allegation of dissipation of assets was a mere speculation and that cannot be special circumstances, so submitted Mr. Wong Kim Fatt. He next argued that to lock up the money which Raja Zainal Abidin was entitled to must surely be a grave prejudice and, consequently, the stay ought not to be granted. I venture to say that the applicant failed to establish by affidavit evidence that Raja Zainal Abidin is insolvent and therefore would not be in a position to reimburse RM25,892,000 and to pay damages in the event the applicant succeeds in her appeal. Unless evidence is adduced to the contrary, I must assume that Raja Zainal Abidin is not insolvent and this assumption is clearly borne out by his affidavit in enclosure 45."

We are therefore of the view that, applying the nugatory approach in the circumstances of this case, we would also grant a stay pending appeal, as the stay would not render nugatory the summary judgment given in favour of the Respondent in the event of the Appellant failing in its appeal in the Court of Appeal. The costs of this application will be costs in the cause.

Dated: 19th September 2007.

(Datuk Haji Mokhtar bin Haji Sidin)
Judge
Court of Appeal, Malaysia

Hearing in Putrajaya on 16th and 18th July 2007.

Counsel for Appellant	:	Dr. Wong Kim Fatt (Mr. Wong Boon Lee with him).
Solicitors for Appellant	:	M/s Gulam & Wong.
Counsel for Respondent	:	Mr. Tan Hee Soon.
Solicitors for Respondent	:	M/s Tan Hee Soon & Co.