DALAM MAHKAMAH PERSEKUTUAN MALAYSIA

( BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN )

RAYUAN JENAYAH NO 05-40-2002 (W)

BETWEEN

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR APPELLANT

AND

TAN TATT EEK RESPONDENT

DALAM MAHKAMAH PERSEKUTUAN MALAYSIA

( BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN )

RAYUAN JENAYAH NO 05-41-2002 (W)

BETWEEN

TAT TATT EEK APPELLANT

AND

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR RESPONDENT

DALAM MAHKAMAH PERSEKUTUAN MALAYSIA

( BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN )

RAYUAN JENAYAH NO 05-68-2002 (P)

BETWEEN

ABDUL RAHIM BIN KALANDARI MUSTAN APPELLANT

AND

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR RESPONDENT

DALAM MAHKAMAH PERSEKUTUAN MALAYSIA

( BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN )

RAYUAN JENAYAH NO 05-70-2002 (P)

BETWEEN

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR APPELLANT

AND

ABDUL RAHIM BIN KALANDARI MUSTAN RESPONDENT

CORAM

AHMAD FAIRUZ SHEIKH ABDUL HALIM, CJ

ABDUL MALEK AHMAD, PCA

HAIDAR MOHD NOOR, CJM

STEVE SHIM LIP KIONG, CJSS

SITI NORMA YAAKOB, FCJ

PAJAN SINGH GILL, FCJ

AUGUSTINE PAUL, JCA

JUDGMENT OF DATO' AUGUSTINE PAUL, JCA

The two appeals were heard together as they involved a common question of law, that is to say, whether under the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (“the Act”) the presumption of possession under section 37(d) can constitute evidence of possession under section 37(da). All references in this judgment to sections are references to sections of the Act.

In order to appreciate the arguments advanced by both parties it is first necessary to set out the relevant parts of section 37. They read as follows:

“37. In all proceedings under this Act or any regulation made thereunder –

(d) any person who is found to have had in his custody or under his control anything whatsoever containing any dangerous drug shall, until the contrary is proved, be deemed to have been in possession of such drug and shall, until the contrary is proved, be deemed to have known the nature of such drug;

(da) any person who is found in possession of –

(i) 15 grammes or more in weight of heroin;

(ii) 15 grammes or more in weight of morphine;

(iii) 15 grammes or more in weight of heroin, morphine and monoacetyl-morphines or a total of 15 grammes or more in weight of any two of the said dangerous drugs;

(iv) 1,000 grammes or more in weight of prepared opium;

… … … … … … … …

otherwise than in accordance with the authority of this Act or any other written law, shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, to be trafficking in the said drug;”

While section 37(d) creates a presumption to establish possession section 37(da) provides that possession of dangerous drugs of or above the weight specified therein shall be presumed to be trafficking in such drug. In Muhammed bin Hassan v PP (1998) 2 MLJ 273 this Court considered the use of the two presumptions together and Chong Siew Fai CJ (Sabah and Sarawak) in writing for the Court said at pp 288 – 289:

“The wordings of sub-ss (d) and (da) of s 37 are clear and unequivocal. That being so, their meanings must be determined from the language employed and the two subsections must be taken to mean exactly what they respectively say. Also, generally speaking, if the words in a statute admit of two interpretations, then they are not clear, and if one interpretation is more favourable to an accused than the other, the court will adopt the one more favourable to the accused.

Since the literal meanings of the two subsections are intelligible, they must not be extended on the ground that there has been a slip or a matter not provided for which should have been provided for. Any ambiguity or slip would be a matter for the legislature. In Magor and St Mellows Rural District Council v Newport Corp (1952) AC 189, Lord Simonds observed (at p 191):

‘The duty of the court is to interpret the words that the legislature has used; those words may be ambiguous, but, even if they are, the power and duty of the court to travel outside them on a voyage of discovery are strictly limited.

If a gap is disclosed, the remedy lies in an amending Act.’

In our view, there is a clear undeniable distinction between the word ‘deemed’ used in s 37(d) and the word ‘found’ employed in s 37(da) of the Act. The ‘deemed’ state of affairs in s 37(d) (ie deemed possession and deemed knowledge) is by operation of law and there is no necessity to prove how that particular state of affairs is arrived at. There need only to be established the basic or primary facts necessary to give rise to that state of affairs, ie the finding of custody or control. Such presumptions as under s 37(d) (and, for that matter, the one under s 37(da)) are sometimes described as ‘compelling presumptions’ in that upon proof of certain facts by a party (in our present case, proof of custody or control in s 37(d) by the prosecution), the court must in law draw a presumption in its favour (ie presumptions of possession and knowledge) unless the other party proves the contrary. Such a presumption has the compelling force of law. It is a deduction which the law requires the trial court to make. On the other hand, the word ‘found’ in the opening phrase of s 37(da) connotes a finding after a trial by the court.

Furthermore, the basic or primary facts needed to raise ‘deemed’ possession and ‘deemed’ knowledge under s 37(d) of the Act and those required to raise ‘presumed … … … trafficking’ under s 37(da) are different. To come to the presumptions of possession and knowledge under s 37(d), one need only to arrive at a finding of having had ‘in custody or under … … … control anything whatsoever containing’ the drug (as opposed to the drug itself) whereas to arrive at the presumption of ‘trafficking’ under s 37(da), a finding of being ‘in possession’ of the drug is necessary (in addition, of course, to proof of the relevant minimum quantity specified). In view of the above difference, it would be unduly harsh and oppressive to construe the automatic application of presumption upon presumption as contended by the learned deputy public prosecutor – a construction that ought to be adopted only if, upon the wordings of the two subsections, such an intention of the Parliament is clear, which, in our opinion, is not.

In our view, to constitute ‘possession’ under s 37(da) of the Act, so as to be capable of forming one of the ingredients thereunder thereby giving rise to the presumption of trafficking, there must be an express affirmative finding (as opposed to legal presumption) of possession as understood in criminal law, based on evidence.”

In substance therefore the judgment is based on the grounds that, firstly, as the word “found” in section 37(da) connotes a finding after a trial while the presumed fact under section 37(d) is one that the Court is compelled by law to deduce there is a distinction between them, and, secondly, as the basic facts necessary to raise the presumptions in section 37(d) and section 37(da) are different it would be harsh and oppressive to apply the double presumptions together unless it is the intention of Parliament, which is not. Accordingly, the phrase “found in possession” in section 37(da) was construed to mean an express affirmative finding of possession based on evidence thereby excluding “deemed” possession arising from section 37(d). The validity of this conclusion would depend on the meaning and proper interpretation of the phrase “found in possession” in section 37(da). If indeed it is a reference to only affirmative evidence of being found in possession then it would not include “deemed” possession. It would be otherwise if its meaning extends beyond affirmative evidence. Its proper meaning would depend on the intention of Parliament in enacting it.

In commenting on the intention of Parliament in passing a statute Bindra’s Interpretation of Statutes 7^th Ed says at p 472:

“If the intention of the Legislature can be ascertained all rules of construction must yield to the legislative intention (Board of Trustees v John Steele 1933 SCR (SC) 47). They cannot override the legislative intent specifically expressed in the enactment (State of UP v Jaipal Singh Naresh 1978 All LJ 936). If the intention of the legislature is clear, that intention constitutes the law.”

The intention of Parliament is conveyed either expressly or impliedly by the language used by the Legislature (see Moolchard v Moraraj Kumar Jai Singh AIR 1963 Raj 219; Ganeslal v Board of Revenue, Rajasthan ILR 1966 16 Raj 577). As Bindra’s Interpretation of Statutes 7^th Ed says at p 474:

“The primary duty of a court is to give effect to the intention of the Legislature in the words used by it and no outside consideration can be called in aid to find another intention (Nathu Prasad v Singhai Kapurchand 1976 JLK 340). It is a well established canon of interpretation that the intent of the Legislature is to be gathered from the words used (Secretary to Government, Punjab Revenue v Jagar Singh 1977 Rev LR 104) and that if the words used have not acquired any technical meaning they should be deemed to have been used in their ordinary meaning (SS Harishchandra Jain v Capt Inder Singh 1977 JLJ 312.”

Thus when the words of a statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, that is to say, they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of the consequences (as Nelson Motis v Union of India AIR 1992 SC (1981). As Tindal CJ said in the Sussex Peerage Case (1844) 11 C1 & F85 at p 143:

“If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves do alone in such cases best declare the intent of the lawgiver.”

It is clear that the phrase “found in possession” in section 37(da) has not been restricted or qualified in any way by the use of other words. It must thus be interpreted as it stands in its ordinary meaning. There can be no dispute that the phrase is a reference to a finding of possession made by the Court. What is in dispute is the nature of evidence that it has in contemplation. The word “found” is the past tense of the word “find”. A finding is made by the Court upon a consideration of all the evidence adduced in a trial. In adverting to the meaning of the word “finding” the Allahabad High Court said in Pt Hazari Lal v Income Tax Officer, Kanpur (1960) 39 ITR 265 at p 272:

“The word ‘finding’, interpreted in the sense indicated by us above, will only cover material questions which arise in a particular case for decision by the authority hearing the case or the appeal which, being necessary for passing the final order or giving the final decision in the appeal, has been the subject of controversy between the interested parties or on which the parties concerned have been given a hearing.”

Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 3^rd Ed defines the word in the following terms:

“A judicial statement of a conclusion of law or fact. State ex ref Higgins v Beloit, 74 Wis 267, 42 NW 110.”

Ordinarily, therefore, the word “found” includes a conclusion of law. A “conclusion of law” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary 6^th Ed as:

“Statement of Court as to law applicable on basis of facts found by jury. Finding by Court as determined through application of rules of law.”

A presumption of law (like section 37(d)) is a rule of law (see Field’s Law of Evidence 12^th Ed Vol I p 388). It arises when the rule of law is applied to facts that require to be proved and have in fact been proved. It is therefore a conclusion of law. Thus a presumption of law must ordinarily come within the meaning of “found in possession” in section 37(da); thereby bringing “deemed” possession within its ambit. At this stage it is perhaps necessary to refer to the part of the judgment in Muhammed bin Hassan v PP (1998) 2 MLJ 273 where it was held that there is “ … … … no material difference … … … ” between “proved to have had in possession” and “found in possession”. It was then concluded that both necessitate a finding or proof of possession beyond reasonable doubt based on evidence. If this is intended to mean that the word “proved” is also a reference to affirmative evidence it becomes necessary to refer to Sengupta on Evidence where it says at p 43:

“Proof, apart from argument and inference drawn from facts in evidence, is effected by (a) evidence (b) presumptions, and (c) judicial notice (Phipson, 12^th Ed, S2). Proof is that which leads to a conclusion as to the truth or falsity of alleged facts which are the subject of inquiry.”

Thus the word “proved” also includes a presumption. In view of this result the conclusion ought to be that “found” also includes a presumption as it has been correctly recognised that there is no material difference between both the concepts. Be that as it may, the effect of the judgment in Muhammed bin Hassan v PP (1998) 2 MLJ 273 is to narrow down the scope of the presumption in section 37(d). If indeed that is the intention of the Act then the exclusion of “deemed” possession from the ambit of section 37(da) would be justified. This brings into focus the circumstances in which a statutory provision can be restrictively construed so as to limit the effect of a presumption.

The general rule is that the consequences of a presumption, a legal fiction, must be allowed to take its natural course. Thus in commenting on the effect of a legal fiction Jeevan Reddy J said in Union of India v Jalyan Udyog AIR 1994 SC 88 at p 96 – 97:

“It is well settled that where a fiction is created by a provision of law, the court must give full effect to the fiction, and as is often said, it should not allow its imagination to be boggled by any other considerations. Fiction must be given its due play; there is to be no half-way stop.”

Where it is to take its natural course “ … … … it shall have to be treated as so during the entire course of the proceeding” (see Bindra’s Interpretation of Statutes 7^th Ed p 45). It must therefore be given its due play for all purposes of the trial without any half-way stop. However, the consequences of a fiction may be restricted. As Lord Asquith of Bishopstone said in East End Dwellings Co Ltd v Finsbury Borough Council (1952) AC 109 at pp 132 – 133:

“If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it. One of these in this case is emancipation from the 1939 level of rents. The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.”

In law, therefore, the scope of a legal fiction as the one in section 37(d) can be restricted. As to whether its effect has in fact been restricted would depend on the intention of Parliament in enacting section 37. As stated earlier, in Muhammed Hassan v PP (1998) 2 MLJ 273 section 37(da) was construed the way it was done to exclude the operation of a presumption upon a presumption on the ground that it was not intended by Parliament and that it would be harsh and oppressive to do so.

In determining the intention of Parliament in enacting section 37 it must be remembered that it is a rule of construction that each section in each statute must, for its true meaning and effect, depend on its own language, context and setting (see State of UP v Tobit AIR 1958 SC 414). The fact that section 37(d) is itself a subsection of section 37 makes no difference to its interpretation. It is an elementary rule that the construction of a section is to be made of all the parts together and that it is not permissible to omit any part of it (see State of Bihar v Hiralal AIR 1960 SC 47). Sub-sections in a section must, therefore, be read as part of an integral whole and as being interdependent, each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest and a harmonious construction should be placed on them for the purpose of giving effect to the legislative intent (see Madanlal Fakir Chand v Changdeo Sugar Mills AIR 1962 SC 1543; Asharfi Lal v Board of Revenue 1977 AWC 454). Thus the language used in the enacting part of section 37 plays a critical role in ascertaining its intention. It makes it applicable to “ … … … all proceedings under this Act … … … .” The effect of a somewhat similar provision arose for consideration in CIT, Bombay v Bombay Corporation AIR 1930 PC 54. In that case section 43 of the Indian Income Tax Act 1922 provided that under certain circumstances an agent shall for all the purposes of the said Act be deemed to be such agent of a non-resident person and section 42 further provided that such agent “shall be deemed to be, for all the purposes of this Act, the assessee”. The Privy Council held that such agent was an assessee for all the purposes of the said Act and hence chargeable to income tax, assessee being defined by section 2(2) as the person by whom income tax is payable. See also Marathaei d/a Sangulullai v Syarikat JG Containers (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor (2003) 2 MLJ 337. Thus section 37 which deals with various presumptions has been designed by its clear words to apply to all proceedings under the Act. As the intention of Parliament is clearly ascertainable all other rules of construction must yield to the legislative intention. It follows that the manner of proving possession as enunciated in section 37(d) must apply to all proceedings under the Act. Full effect must therefore be given to the fiction in section 37(d) without in any way creating any hurdles to its inevitable corollaries. The inevitable conclusion is that section 37(d) is not restricted in its application to any proceeding under the Act.

The resultant matter for determination is whether section 37(d) also applies to section 37(da) – a provision which deals with a matter of procedure as it involves a presumption. That would depend on whether it comes within the meaning of the word “proceedings” in the enacting part of section 37. The word is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary 6^th Ed as:

“In a general sense, the form and manner of conducting juridical business before a court or judicial officer. Regular and orderly progress in form of law, including all possible steps in an action from its commencement to the execution of judgment. … … …

An act which is done by the authority or direction of the court, agency, or tribunal, express or implied; an act necessary to be done in order to obtain a given end; a prescribed mode of action for carrying into effect a legal right. All the steps or measures adopted in the prosecution or defense of an action. Statter v United States, CCA Alaska, 66 F 2d 819, 822. The word may be used synonymously with ‘action’ or ‘suit’ to describe the entire course of an action at law or suit in equity from the issuance of the writ or filing of the complaint until the entry of a final judgment, or may be used to describe any act done by authority of a court of law and every step required to be taken in any cause by either party. The proceedings of a suit embrace all matters that occur in its progress judicially.

Term ‘proceeding’ may refer not only to a complete remedy but also to a mere procedural step that is part of a larger action or special proceeding.”

It is thus manifestly patent that the word “proceedings” also includes matters of procedure like steps adopted in the prosecution of an action which in turn would include the manner of proving or fixing the burden of proof in establishing an issue. Section 37(da) is such a matter of procedure and, accordingly, falls within the meaning of “proceedings” in section 37. Section 37(d) therefore applies to section 37(da). The result is that “deemed” possession in section 37(d) cannot be excluded from the ambit of section 37(da). It must be stressed that even though this approach amounts to the operation of a presumption upon a presumption it is not unlawful as it is expressly authorised by Parliament. In this regard Principles of Statutory Interpretation by GP Singh 6^th Ed says at 249:

“The legislature may sometimes create a chain of fictions by the same Act or by succeeding Acts. If A is deemed to be B, and B is deemed to be C, the inevitable consequence may be that A is deemed to be C. By section 8 or the Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949, any order made by His Majesty in Council on an Indian Appeal was to have effect as if it were an order or decree made by the Federal Court and by Article 374(2) of the Constitution, judgments and orders of the Federal Court are to have the same effect as if they had been delivered or made by the Supreme Court. The legal effect of these two fictions is, that an order in an Indian Appeal made by the Privy Council before its jurisdiction was abolished, is to have effect as if it were an order made by the Supreme Court (Yellappagouda Shankargouda Patil v Basangouda Shiddangouda Patil, AIR 1960 SC 808).”

As it is the clear intention of Parliament to allow the presumption contained in section 37(d) to take its natural course its use in section 37(da) cannot be restricted in any manner. It must thus be given its full effect. It follows that the ordinary meaning of the phrase “found in possession” in section 37(da) is not restricted in any way even though it involves a presumption. It must therefore include a conclusion of law thereby bringing “deemed” possession in section 37(d) within its scope.

It may perhaps be also necessary to consider whether the operation of the presumption in section 37(d) upon the presumption in section 37(da) is harsh and oppressive if indeed it can be argued that the intention of Parliament in creating them is not clear. In commenting on the course to be adopted in such a situation Principles of Statutory Interpretation by GP Singh 6^th Ed says at p 89:

“If the language used is capable of bearing more than one construction, in selecting the true meaning regard must be had to the consequences resulting from adopting the alternative construction. A construction that results in hardship, serious inconvenience, injustice, absurdity or anomaly or which leads to inconsistency or uncertainty and friction in the system which the statute purports to regulate has to be rejected and preference should be given to that construction which avoids such results. This rule has no application when the words are susceptible to only one meaning and no alternative construction is reasonably open.”

In Muhammed bin Hassan v PP (1998) 2 MLJ 273 the operation of the double presumption was held to be harsh and oppressive in view of the different basic facts that need proof under section 37(d) and section 37(da) and that in view of the difference the automatic application of a presumption upon a presumption can be adopted only if it was intended by Parliament, which was not. I must add that if this reasoning can be sustained then the interpretation accorded to section 37(da) cannot be impugned. However, it is my misfortune to say that the conclusion was arrived at without a consideration of the circumstances in which double presumptions can be held to be inapplicable. The law relating to double presumptions has been considered in some American cases and the position has been aptly summarised in Field’s Law of Evidence 12^th Ed Vol I at p 396:

“The law does not permit an inference or a presumption (Direct Sales Co v United states, 319 US 703; Nation v United States (CA 3d) 113 F 2d 97) to be based upon another inference or presumption. The danger of permitting inference to be based upon inferences or presumptions upon presumptions is that in such cases fact B would be presumed or inferred from fact A, and fact C would be presumed or inferred from fact B. This would in effect mean that fact C would be inferred or presumed from fact A. If the law would not permit fact C to be inferred or presumed directly from the existence of fact A it is manifestly improper to allow that presumption or inference to be made under the guise of a double inference or double presumption.

The reason for the prohibition, however, indicates the exception which can be made whenever from the existence of one fact, that is A, common experience indicates that ordinarily B will exist and that if B exists, C will also exist, it is proper to infer or presume that C exists once it is shown that A exists (Ribaste v United States (CCA 8^th) 44 F 2d 21; Brown v State, 219 Ind 21; State v Dennis 177 Or 73). Thus, in a prosecution for the unlawful possession of burglar tools, the jury may infer from the fact of possession of the tools by the defendant’s companion that the tools were in the defendant’s possession and that he intended to use them feloniously (State v Biyan, 69 Ohio App 306).”

The objection to the operation of double presumptions is anchored on the fact that it would in effect mean that the second presumption is based on the basic facts of the first presumption when ordinarily it is not permissible in law. It is implicit that if the basic facts to be proved in respect of both the presumptions are different the objection cannot prevail.

In order to determine whether the operation of the presumptions in section 37(d) and section 37(da) is objectionable it must first be observed that the presumption of possession is, on its own, capable of amounting to a case of trafficking without the aid of a presumption. Section 39B(1) which creates the offence of trafficking does not prescribe any weight that is required in order to constitute the offence. In commenting on section 15 of the Singapore Misuse of Drugs Act which contains a presumption similar to that in section 37(da) Lord Diplock said in Ong Ah Chuan v PP (1981) 1 MLJ 64 at p 69:

“Proof of the purpose for which an act is done where such purpose is a necessary ingredient of the offence with which an accused is charged, presents a problem with which criminal courts are very familiar. Generally, in the absence of an express admission by the accused, the purpose with which he did an act is a matter of inference from what he did. Thus, in the case of an accused caught in the act of conveying from one place to another controlled drugs in a quantity much larger than is likely to be needed for his own consumption the inference that he was transporting them for the purpose of trafficking in them would, in the absence of any plausible explanation by him, be irresistible – even if there were no statutory presumption such as is contained in section 15 of the Drugs Act.

As a matter of common sense the larger the quantity of drugs involved the stronger the inference that they were not intended for the personal consumption of the person carrying them, and the more convincing the evidence needed to rebut it. All that section 15 does is to lay down the minimum quantity of each of the five drugs with which it deals at which the inference arises from the quantity involved alone that they were being transported for the purpose of transferring them to another person and not solely for the transporter’s own consumption. There may be other facts which justify the inference even where the quantity of drugs involved is lower than the minimum which attracts the statutory presumption under section 15.”

It is therefore clear that possession of dangerous drugs can constitute trafficking without the aid of a presumption depending on the quantity of drugs involved. Section 37(da) fixes a minimum quantity that will lead rise to the presumption. Thus the dominant element that will activate section 37(da) is the weight of the drugs possessed and not possession itself. It follows that the presumption of possession arising from section 37(d) does not, on its own, raise the presumption of trafficking under section 37(da). Further evidence of the weight of the drugs involved must be adduced in order to invoke section 37(da) upon proof of possession under section 37(d). The basic facts to be proved for the activation of both the presumptions are therefore different. In view of this difference it cannot be suggested that the presumption of trafficking is based on the basic facts of the presumption of possession. I pause to add that the requirement of different basic facts for the activation of section 37(d) and section 37(da) was indeed recognised in Muhammed bin Hassan v PP (1998) 2 MLJ 273 but, unfortunately, was not analysed the way it should have been. It is my respectful view that it is the misapprehension of the circumstances in which a double presumption may be held to be inapplicable that led to the interpretation of section 37(da) the way it was done. As the double presumptions contained in section 37(d) and section 37(da) are clear in their requirement of the different basic facts to be proved they are not harsh and oppressive and must prevail even if the intention of Parliament in creating them is not clear. The restriction placed on the clear meaning of section 37(da) cannot therefore be sustained.

In the circumstances it is my view that it is the intention of Parliament to allow the presumptions contained in section 37(d) and (da) to operate side by side. In the upshot, and with respect, I am unable to subscribe to the curtailment of the scope of section 37(da) in Muhammed bin Hassan v PP (1998) 2 MLJ 273 to make it inapplicable to instances where possession has been presumed under section 37(d).

Date: 3 February 2005

Sgd

( DATO' AUGUSTINE PAUL )

Judge

Court of Appeal

Malaysia

Counsel:

Rayuan Jenayah No 05-40-2002 (W) and 05-41-2002 (W)

Timbalan Kanan Pendakwa Raya Dato’ Mohd Yusof bin Zainal Abiden for the Appellant and Cross Respondent

(Attorney General’s Chambers)

Gurbachan Singh s/o Bagawan Singh (Kartar Singh and Amrit Pal Singh with him) for the Respondent and Cross Appellant

(Solicitors: Messrs Bachan & Kartar)

and

Rayuan Jenayah No 05-70-2002 (P) and 05-68-2002 (P)

Karpal Singh (Jagdeep Singh Deo with him) for the Appellant and Cross Respondent

(Solicitors: Messrs Karpal Singh & Company)

Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Shamsul bin Sulaiman for the Respondent and Cross Appellant

(Attorney General’s Chambers)