DALAM MAHKAMAH PERSEKUTAUN DI
(BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN)
RAYUAN SIVIL NO. 02-03-2004(J)
ANTARA
CHAN
YOCK
DAN
CHAN
TEONG PENG … RESPONDEN
CORAM: AHMAD FAIRUZ SHEIKH ABDUL HALIM CJ
PAJAN
SINGH GILL FCJ
By a notice of motion dated 17 December 2004, the Applicant,
inter alia, prayed for the following orders:
1.
That leave
be granted that
Civil Appeal No.02-03-2004(J) be re-heard;
2.
That
the judgment of this court delivered on 22 October 2004 be set aside.
3.
That
the execution of the said judgment be stayed pending the final disposal of this
court in respect of this motion.
To
give a brief history of the case, the Respondent commenced proceedings in the
High Court, Johor Bahru praying for specific performance of an agreement dated
16 December 1995 and, alternatively, for
a declaration that the Respondent and/or his nominee is the registered and
beneficial owner of 32,630 shares in Son
Huut Plantation Sdn. Bhd. (“SHP”) and that the company secretary registers the
Respondent and/or his nominee as the legal and beneficial owner of the said
shares.
The Respondent then
applied for a summary judgment pursuant to Order 81 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (“RHC
1980”).
The High Court made an
order declaring that the Respondent or his nominee was the beneficial owner of
the said shares but dismissed the prayer that the company secretary registers the shares in the name of the
Respondent or his nominee on the ground that the secretary was not made a
party.
The Applicant then
appealed to the Court of Appeal. The
Respondent also cross-appealed against the refusal of the High Court to direct
the company secretary to register the said shares in the name of the Respondent
or his nominee. On 3 April 2002, the
Court of Appeal dismissed both the Applicant’s appeal and the Respondent’s
cross appeal.
On 3 March 2004, this
court granted the Applicant leave to appeal to this Court on the following
question:
“whether the beneficial
interest (but not the legal interest) in the shares of a private limited
company can pass from a Vendor to the Purchaser upon the disposal of the said
shares in non-compliance with the restriction on transfer of share provisions
contained in the article of association of the said private limited company
i.e. the shares must be offered to the existing members of the company before
it may be transferred to a non-member of the company.”
On 17 March 2004, the
Respondent filed a notice of cross-appeal.
The appeal was heard by
this court on 15 July 2004. On 22
October 2004, this court delivered its judgment wherein the Applicant’s appeal
was dismissed with costs and the Respondent’s cross-appeal was allowed with costs. This court thus declared that the Respondent
was both the beneficial and legal owner of the said shares and further ordered
the company secretary to register the Respondent or his nominee as the
“beneficial and registrable owner” of the shares. The judgment of this Court was reported in
(2004) 4 CLJ 533.
It is that judgment of
this court that the Applicant is asking this court to set aside and that the
appeal be re-heard.
Learned counsel for the
Applicant listed a number of “errors in law and or errors in law and fact” in
the judgment of this court dated 22 October 2004 as grounds to support this application. They are, in brief:
(1)
This
court failed to consider that the agreement in question was a bilateral
contract and therefore could not involve third parties including the other
shareholders of SHP.
(2)
This
court failed to consider that the share
certificates in question were deposited with the respondent as a
collateral or pledge to secure the repayment of RM270,000.00 paid by the
Respondent to the Applicant for the purchase of 8,039 shares in Chan Tiong Kwai
Realty Sdn. Bhd. (“CTK”).
(3)
The
court erred in law in relying on section 6A(6) of the Companies Act 1965
without considering properly whether the said section was applicable to a
private limited company.
(4)
This
court failed to consider that section 15 of the Companies Act 1965 was
applicable to the case and not section 6A(6).
(5)
This
court only took into consideration the case of Hawks v. Mc Arthur & Ors.
(1951) 1 All.ER 22 (High Court, Chancery Division) but failed to consider Hunter
v. Hunter (1936) AC 222 (H.L.), Sing Eng (Pte) Ltd. v. PIC Property Ltd
(1990) 3 MLJ 129 (C.A. Singapore) and Gan Sin Tuan v. Chew Kian Kor
(1958) 24 MLJ 62 (CA, Malaya).
(6)
This
court made a wrong finding of fact that the Applicant had offered the said
shares to the other shareholders.
(7)
This
court made a wrong finding of fact that the Applicant had obtained the consent
of the board of directors to transfer the said shares to the Respondent.
(8)
This
court had committed a breach of natural justice in that the court had ordered
the registration of the shares in the name of the Respondent or his nominee
without hearing the other shareholders of the company who were not parties to
the proceedings. This has resulted in
serious injustice to them.
(9)
The
judgment has wide ranging repercussions and “may not be consistent with other
apex court authorities which were decided in our country or in the Commonwealth
.…….”
From the grounds listed by the Applicant, it can be seen that the Applicant is questioning the correctness of the judgment in law and on facts. In other words, the Applicant is questioning the judgment on merits. Questioned by the court at the beginning of his submission learned counsel for the Applicant admitted that he was not challenging the validity of the constitution of the court that heard the appeal. In fact, he admitted that he was challenging the correctness of the judgment on merits. In fact, whether he admits it or not, that is our view.
Regarding the law under
which he made this application, learned counsel said that he was making this
application pursuant to rule 137 of the Rules of the Federal Court 1995 (“RFC
1995”).
Regarding the law, it
must be noted that neither the Federal
Constitution nor the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (“CJA 1964”) provides that
this court has jurisdiction to set aside its earlier decision or judgment and to direct that the case (or appeal) be
re-heard, re-considered and re-decided.
The provision that is usually relied on, as in this case, is rule 137 of
the RFC 1995 which provides:
“137 Inherent powers of the Court
For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared
that nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent
powers of the Court to hear any application or to make any order as may be
necessary to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the
Court.”
Of late, this rule has received a lot of attention and a lot of importance has been attributed to it. See, for example, Chia Yan Tek & Anor v. Ng Swee Kiat & Anor (2001) 4 CLJ 61 F.C. Megat Najmuddin Dato’ Seri (Dr) Megat Khas v. Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd. (2002) 1 MLJ 385 F.C., MGG Pillai v. Tan Sri Dato’ Vincent Tan Chee Yioun (2002) 3 CLJ 577, Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Public Prosecutor (2004) 3 MLJ 517 F.C., Allied Capital Sdn. Bhd. v. Mohd. Latiff bin Shah Mohd. & Another Applicant (2004) 4 CLJ 350 F.C. and Adorna Properties Sdn. Bhd. v. Kobchai Sosothikul (2005) 1 CLJ 565 F.C.
Our first comment is that
we should always bear in mind that that
rule is a general rule to be found at the end of the RFC 1995 which contains
rules of procedure for use in the Federal Court. RFC 1995 provides for rules of procedure to
be followed in and by the Federal Court, including what kind of applications
may be made, how and when; how an appeal
is to be lodged, prepared for the hearing, heard and how the judgment is to be
pronounced and so on. These are all
matters of procedure. Then, as in the
case of the RHC 1980, Order 92, rule 4, a general provision is inserted to
declare that nothing in the RFC 1995 “shall be deemed to limit or effect the
inherent powers of the Court to hear any application or to make any order
…….” In other words, it clarifies that
whatever inherent powers the court has is preserved.
So, in our view, it is
not quite right to say that rule 137 “confers” or “gives” inherent powers to
the Federal Court as has been said in a number of cases e.g. Megat Najmuddin
(supra), Chia Yan Teck (supra), Allied Capital Sdn. Bhd.
(supra), MGG Pillai (supra) and Adorna Properties Sdn. Bhd.
(supra). In any event, rule 137 not only
assumes but confirms that the Federal
Court has such inherent powers, otherwise there is nothing to preserve.
In fact, a similar view has been expressed by Edgar Joseph Jr. FCJ in R. Rama Chandran v. The Industrial Court of Malaysia (1997) 1 MLJ 145 @ 238-239:
“In my view, O 92 r4 is a
unique rule of court for while it neither defines nor gives jurisdiction, yet
it serves as a reminder and confirmation – lest we forget – of the common law
powers of the court, which are residuary
or reserve powers and a separate and
distinct source of jurisdiction from the statutory powers of the court.
In other words, even without
O.92 r4, the inherent powers of High Court would still be there. In the
Similarly, I have no doubt
that in this country, the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court also exercise
inherent jurisdiction.”
Two points should be noted here. First, the learned Judge was talking about the inherent powers of the High Court even without the provision of Order 92 rule 4 of the RHC 1980, in spite of the provision of Article 121(1) of the Federal Constitution. We shall elaborate on this later.
Secondly, the learned Judge said that he had no doubt “that in this country, the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court also exercise inherent jurisdiction.”
In Megat Najmuddin (supra) Steve Shim CJ (Sabah and Sarawak) was of the view that the “the Federal Court also has the inherent jurisdiction under the common law to deal with cases with a view to preventing injustice in limited circumstances.”
There are numerous judgments of the courts in the country on inherent jurisdictions of the courts, especially of the High Courts, whether decided prior to or after Article 121(1) was amended by Act A 740 that came into force from 10 June 1988 in which the words “there shall be” were substituted for the words “Subject to Clause (2) the judicial power of the Federation shall be vested in clause (1).” Confining to the judgments of this court and the Supreme Court, the following are some of them: Phileoallied Bank (Malaysia) Bhd. v. Bhupinder Singh Avatar Singh & Anor (2002) 2 CLJ 612 (F.C), Zainur Zakaria v. P.P. (2001)3 CLJ 673 (F.C.), Kesultanan Pahang v. Sathask Realty Sdn. Bhd. (1998) 2 CLJ 559 (F.C.) Badiaddin Mohd. Mahidin & Anor v. Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd. (1998) 2 CLJ 75 (F.C), Scotch Leasing Sdn. Bhd. v. Chee Pok Choy & Ors (1997) 2 CLJ 58 (F.C.), Tuan Haji Ahmed Abdul Rahman v. Arab-Malaysian Finance Berhad (1996) 1 CLJ 241, Muniandy a/l Thamba Kaundan & Anor v. Development & Commercial Bank Berhad & Anor (1996) 2 CLJ 586 (F.C.), Government of Malaysia v. Jasanusa Sdn. Bhd (1995) 2 CLJ 701 (S.C.), Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd. v. Kawal Teliti Sdn. Bhd. (1995) 3 CLJ 783 (S.C.), United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd. v. Palm and Vegetable Oils (M) Sdn. Bhd. & 3 Ors. (1994) 3 CLJ 144 (S.C.), Puah Bee Hong @ Bee Hong (F) & Anor v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur & Anor (Robert Teo Keng Tuan, Intervener) & Another case (1994) 2 CLJ 705 (S.C.), Raja Zainal Abidin bin Raja Haji Tachik & 3 Ors. (1993) 3 CLJ 606 S.C., Wong Sin Chong & Anor. v. Bhagwan Singh & Anor. (1993) 4 CLJ 345 (S.C.)
We shall only discuss three of the above-mentioned cases.
In Tuan Haji Ahmed Abdul Rahman v. Arab Malaysian Finance Berhad (1996) 1 CLJ 241 @ 253 this court, inter alia, said:
“We would add that under its
inherent jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of its proceedings, the Court has
power to set aside a judgment in default, despite the defendant’s application
being out of time if the particular
circumstances of the case require the intervention of the Court.”
It is true that this court in that case was referring to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to set aside a default judgment of that court. However, it reaffirms that even the High Court has inherent jurisdiction. This, if we may add, is in spite of the provisions of Article 121(1) that clearly says that “…. The High Courts …… shall have such jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred by or under federal law.” In this respect, it should be noted that Article 128(3) that talks about jurisdiction of the Federal Court is differently worded, thus:
“(3) The
jurisdiction of the Federal Court to
determine appeals from the Court of Appeal, a High Court or a judge thereof shall be such as may be
provided by federal law.”
First, this provision talks only about “jurisdiction” but not “powers”. Secondly, it is only in respect of appeals, i.e. which appeals may come from the Court of Appeal and which appeals may come direct from the High Court or the judge thereof, all of which as may be provided by federal law. Unlike Article 121(1), Article 128(3) does not talk about the general jurisdictions and powers of the Federal Court, nor about applications or orders.
In Muniandy a/l Thamba Kaundan & Anor v. Development & Commercial Banks Berhad & Anor (1996)2 CLJ 586 (F.C.) this court again reaffirmed the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to set aside an order made by it which is a nullity.
In Badiaddin Mohd. Mahidin & Anor v. Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd. (1998) 2 CLJ 75 (F.C.) all the judges in their separate judgments talked about the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to set aside its own order where it “can be proved to be null and void on the ground of illegality or lack of jurisdiction” per Mohd. Azmi FCJ “even in the absence of an express enabling provision,” per Gopal Sri Ram JCA and “to stay any proceeding (which includes an order of execution) which is an abuse of process,” per Peh Swee Chin FCJ.
So, if the High Court, in spite of the provision of Article 121(1) of the Federal Constitution still has inherent jurisdiction and powers, what more the Federal Court? It is our view therefore, that this court has the inherent jurisdiction and powers, including the jurisdiction to hear this application and the power to make the necessary orders. This jurisdiction and power is inherent in this Court and it is reaffirmed by rule 137 RFC 1995.
The question then is under what circumstances should it be exercised?
In Lee Thye Sang & Anor v. Faber Merlin
(M) Sdn. Berhad & Ors (1986) 1 MLJ 166 (S.C.), the applicants applied
by motion for an order that the judgment
of the Supreme Court in civil appeals,
in which they were respondents, be reviewed.
The applicants invoked the provision of section 69, in particular sub-sections (3) and (4) of the CJA 1964 to
support their application that the Supreme Court had such a power.
The Supreme Court
dismissed the application. Delivering
the judgment of the court, Abdul Hamid C.J. (
“The
question before the Court is, therefor, whether sub-section (4) can be
construed to confer an unlimited power on the Supreme Court to review, meaning to re-open, re-examine
and reconsider with a view to correction, variation, alteration or
reversal, if necessary, an earlier decision in an appeal that has already been
heard and disposed of.
Our
view is that there is no merit in the contention made by the applicants. Sub-section (4) of the Act cannot be
construed to mean that it confers unlimited power upon the Supreme Court
to re open, re-hear or re-examine, if necessary, to reverse or set aside
a judgment given in an appeal already heard and disposed of by it. So to construe would indeed not only be contrary to the
clear meaning to the words used in
section 69 but also contrary to
Article 128(1) of the Federal
Constitution.
Article
128(3) states that “the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to determine appeals
from a High Court or a judge
thereof shall be such as may be provided
by federal law.”
The
Courts of Judicature Act, 1964 is such a law made pursuant to Clause (3) of
Article 128.
With respect to appeals, section 41 of the Act provides that appeals shall be decided in accordance with the opinion of the majority of judges composing the Court. Read in the light of section 67(1), the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in regard to civil appeals shall specifically be to hear an appeal from any judgment or order of any High Court. There is certainly no provision which confers jurisdiction on a Supreme Court to hear and determine appeals from a decision given in an appeal it has already heard and disposed of.
Where, therefore, a final decision has been delivered, an appeal is in effect heard and disposed of. In other words, it is brought to a final conclusion. And that being the case, the Supreme Court has no power to re-open, re-hear and re-examine its decision for whatever purpose. The only exception where there can be a re-hearing is only to the extent provided by section 42, in particular sub-section (3) of section 42. The other exception is as provided under section 44 sub-section (3) to the effect that every order such as that envisaged in sub-section (1) of section 44 may be discharged or varied by the full Court.”
It is important to note
that the court went so far as to invoke
the provision of Article 128(3) of the
Federal Constitution which was substantially the same as it is now except for
the modification arising from the creation of the Court of Appeal in rejecting the argument
that section 69(4) conferred such power to the court. Again, except for the cosmetic changes made
to section 69 as a result of the creation of the Court of Appeal, the
substantive provision of section 69 remains the same.
It is also to be noted
that at that time there was no provision in the Rules of the Supreme Court 1980
equivalent to rule 137 RFC 1995.
Instead, there was rule 163 (“Effect of Non-Compliance”) which was
exactly the same as rule 102 of the Rules of the Court of Appeal 1995 (“RCA
1995”). In fact, with the creation of
the Court of Appeal, rule 163 was
transferred to the RCA 1995 as rule 102.
In any event, that case
shows the attitude of the court towards an application to review a decision of
the court in the same appeal.
Chia Yan Tek & Anor
v. Ng Swee Kiat & Anor [2001]
4 CLJ 61 is a judgment of this court.
The judgment in that case was delivered on 10 August 2001. In that case, the judgment of this court
allowing the appeal from the Court of Appeal was pronounced by the Deputy Registrar on 22 December 2000. But, as on that day, out of the three Judges
who heard the appeal, two of them
had retired, leaving only one. This court held that as the effective date of
the judgment was the date of its pronouncement in open court i.e. 22 December
2000 and as on that day only one out of the three Judges who heard the appeal
was still in service (the other two having retired earlier), the court was not
properly constituted. So, the
application to set aside the order of 22 December 2000 was allowed.
Mohd. Dzaiddin C.J., in
his judgment which was agreed to by the other two Judges used the term “as may
be necessary to prevent injustice.”
The next case is MGG
Pillai v. Tan Sri Vincent Tan Chee Yioun [2002] 3 CLJ 577. The judgment was delivered on 16 May
2002. In that case, this court heard the
appeal on 12 and 13 January 1998 and judgment was reserved. On 12 July 2000, the judgment of the court by
Eusoff Chin, the then Chief Justice and also the presiding Judge, was read out
by the Senior Assistant Registrar. At
the time of the delivery of the judgment, Chong Siew Fai CJ (Sabah &
Sarawak) had retired from the bench. He
retired on 2 July 2000. Both he and Wan Adnan, the then Chief Judge (
This court, by a
majority, allowed the applicant’s application and dismissed the respondent’s
application. In other words, the
judgment of this court pronounced on 12 July 2000 was set aside. Both Siti Norma Yaakob FCJ and Haidar Mohd.
Noor FCJ (as they then were) held that the effective date of the judgment was
the date of its pronouncement in open
court. The court followed Chia Yan
Tek (supra), and held that since there were only two Judges remaining on
that day, and as no consent was given by the parties to the proceedings
pursuant to the requirement of the pre-amended section 78 of the Courts of
Judicature Act 1964 (“CJA 1964”) which was the law applicable in that case, for
the proceedings to be continued by the remaining two Judges, the judgment “was
ineffective and invalid as the court was not properly constituted,” per Siti
Norma Yaakob FCJ at p. 604 of the law report.
Steve Shim (CJ Sabah and
“….. I hold the view that the Federal Court does
have the inherent jurisdiction and power which can be invoked in limited
circumstances to reopen, rehear and reexamine its previous judgment, decision
or order which has been obtained by fraud or supression of material evidence so
as to prevent injustice or an abuse of the process of the court.”
Siti Norma Yaakob FCJ
talked about “whether an injustice has been done …. or whether an abuse of the
process of the court has been committed.”
The learned Judge concluded, on the facts:
“Since
the applicant’s accrued interest has been violated in this case leading to a
miscarriage of justice, it follows that he is entitled to have his appeal
reheard before another panel of this court.”
Haidar FCJ also talked about “injustice” and held that the judgment was invalid.
In Dato’ Seri Anwar
bin Ibrahim v. Public Prosecutor (2004) 3 MLJ 517 (F.C) four motions were
filed. In the first motion, the
applicant asked this court to invoke its inherent powers under rule 137 of the
RFC 1995 to set aside convictions and sentences of the applicant that were
confirmed by this court earlier when the appeal from the court of appeal was
heard. The second motion was for the
court to allow fresh/additional evidence affecting the trial to be
adduced. The third motion was for leave for applicant to be allowed to rely
on five additional grounds. The fourth
motion was for leave for the applicant to rely on another additional ground on
the ground that section 94(2) of the CJA 1964 was unconstitutional and void.
At the commencement of
the hearing of the motion, the respondent raised a preliminary objection on the
first motion that the court did not have the necessary jurisdiction to
re-litigate on such appeals.
The court overruled the
preliminary objections, holding that it had jurisdiction to hear the motions,
proceeded to hear the motion and dismissed them.
The point to be noted is
that the ruling regarding jurisdiction was in respect of hearing the
motions. The motions were dismissed
after hearing them. It is not a case
where the court having granted leave to re-hear the appeal, set aside the
conviction and sentence, re-heard the appeal and then re-confirmed the
conviction and sentence.
Abdul Malek Ahmad PCA
who wrote the judgment on the
preliminary objection stuck to the words of rule 137 i.e. “to prevent injustice
or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court."
In Allied Capital Sdn.
Bhd. v. Mohd. Latiff bin Shah Mohd. & Another Application (2004) 4 CLJ
350, the applicants whose appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed after it
was heard, applied to the Federal Court for leave to appeal to the Federal
Court. The leave application was heard
and dismissed by the Federal Court.
Subsequently the applicants filed two separate notices of motion, inter
alia, praying that the order of the Federal Court dismissing the leave
application be set aside and that they be given leave to appeal to the Federal
Court against the order of the Court of Appeal.
The respondents then applied to strike out the applicants’ motions on a
number of grounds, including that the Federal Court had no jurisdiction or
power to set aside its order refusing leave to appeal or to re-hear the
application.
The court, by a majority,
held that the Federal Court had jurisdiction to hear the applications and that
the “application proper” should be fixed for hearing accordingly. On the test to be applied, the majority
judgment also reiterated the words used in rule 137. The minority judgment reached a different
conclusion because it considered the merits of the application.
The most recent decision
of this court on the issue is Adorna Properties Sdn. Bhd. v. Kobchai
Sosothikul (2005) 1 CLJ 565 (F.C.).
That was also an application pursuant to rule 137 RFC 1995 to set aside
an order of the Federal Court made on 22 December 2000, after hearing the
appeal and for the appeal be re-heard by the court. The ground advanced was “interest of
justice”. Prior to this application,
there was an earlier application (“the first application”) by the same
applicant on the ground that one of the Judges had retired before the judgment was
delivered. The first application was dismissed. This court dismissed the application (the
second application).
P.S. Gill FCJ, delivering
the judgment of the court, inter alia, gave the following reasons:
“Firstly,
although the consequence and effect of the main judgment may be harsh when
viewed without the benefit of the relevant statutory provision, we do not think
this is a case where ‘grave injustice had occasioned’ due to clear infringement
of any principle of law thereby making it permissible for successive
application to be made under the said rule.
Without going into the merits of this application we find that the
substance of the main judgment revolves in the interpretation of s.340
subsection (3) including the proviso thereof of the National Land Code. ……..
And
having read the reasoning therein and bearing in mind the words used in the
said subsection including the proviso we are not convinced that the
interpretation given in the main judgment is patently wrong thereby resulting
in grave injustice thus warranting successive application under r.137. And even if we are wrong our view it should
be left to another occasion to further debate on the issue. For now we are of the opinion that despite
the concession made by learned counsel for the respondent on the issue of
successive application this is not a proper case for us to proceed to hear the
merits or to grant the order as sought
for.
Secondly,
there is much force to be given to the contention that there should be finality
to any litigation. The main judgment was
handed down by this Court which is the apex court of this country. If the application of r.137 is made liberally
the likely consequence would be chaos to our system of judicial hierarchy. There would then be nothing to prevent any
aggrieved litigant from challenging any decision of this court on the ground of
‘injustice’ vide r.137. And if he
succeeds in his application there is
also nothing to bar the other party from making his own application to overturn
such success. In short, there will be no
end to the matter. We do not think that
was the intention of the legislature when promulgating the said rule.
Thirdly,
this present application is weakened by the fact that there was the first
application heard and dismissed by this court.
And it was never suggested that the ground advanced in this application
was not available then. The only reason
given before us was ‘human error’. We do not think that is sufficient for us to
overlook the implication that to allow this application would tantamount to
permitting the applicant to advance his grievances by instalment.
Fourthly,
there is also the element of delay on the part of the applicant. The first application was made in 2001 and
after its disposal there was a lapse of almost 18 months before the present
application was filed on 12 July 2002.
Thus not only the grounds were submitted by way of instalment, there was
delay as well. We do not think this
court should condone, let alone encourage, such an attitude. A court of law is duty-bound to ensure that
the interests of all parties appearing before it are equally safeguarded. Public interest expects it. And it would be highly undesirable and
prejudicial to a successful litigant to be kept in limbo while the unsuccessful
party ponders as to his next course of action.
This
present application is therefore dismissed with costs. Preliminary objection sustained.”
P.S. Gill FCJ, who
delivered the judgment of the court used the term “grave injustice had
occasioned” but held that that was not such a case.
This case clearly shows
the reluctance of this court to set aside its previous order made after the
appeal was fully heard even though the first application that had been
dismissed was grounded on “coram failure” as one of the Judges had retired
prior to the delivery of the judgment in the appeal, a situation which appears
to be similar to Chia Yan Tek (supra).
From the cases, it is clear that, so far, this court had only given orders that
its previous decisions, judgments or orders be set aside and ordered that the
appeals be re-heard when such decisions, judgments or orders were a nullity or
invalid because the court giving such decisions, judgments or orders were not
properly constituted.
We do not say that the
circumstances under which this court would set aside its previous decisions,
judgments or orders and for the re-hearing of the appeals are closed. Neither do we intend to list down the circumstances that warrant such an order. However, to give two examples, there may be
jurisdictional error, for example, where
the court inadvertently heard and decided on an appeal which, in law, is
patently not appealable to this court, or due to illegality where this court
inadvertently imposed a sentence unknown in law or in excess of the maximum
sentence permissible by law.
On the other hand, no
leave to review should be given where the previous order is challenged on its
merits, whether on facts or in law.
Merely because the panel hearing the application is of the view that an
important piece evidence had not been given sufficient weight or that the
current panel disagrees with the interpretation or application of a certain
provision of the law is not a sufficient reason for the court to set aside its
previous order.
The reasons have been
amply stated by this court in Adorna Properties Sdn. Bhd. (supra) with
which we fully agree. The only other
reason we would like to add is that to freely allow previous orders to be
reviewed would lead to “panel shopping”.
An unsuccessful party in an appeal may try its luck before another panel
that may disagree with the view of the earlier panel. If he is successful in having the order
reversed, the other party will do the same thing again. Certainly, we
would not like to see this apex court becoming a circus that repeats the
same show again and again.
Coming back to the
present application. It has been seen
that the applicant questions the findings of this court both in law and on
facts. These are matters of
opinion. Just because we may disagree
(we do not say whether we agree or disagree with such findings) with the
earlier panel of this court, that is not a ground that warrants us to review
the decision. Similarly, regarding the
interpretation and application of some provisions of the Companies Act 1965,
even if we disagree with the earlier panel (again we do not say whether we agree or disagree) that
does not warrant us to set aside the judgment and the order of the earlier
panel of this court and re-hear and review the appeal. Otherwise, as has been said, there would be
no end to a proceeding.
In conclusion, it is our
unanimous view that this is not the kind of case that this court should review
its previous judgment and order. If and when, in another case, the same issue
of law arises, then, after hearing a full argument, this court may reconsider
and decide whether it agrees with its earlier view or not. This court had done that on a number of
occasions before.
For these reasons, we
dismissed the application with costs and ordered that the deposit be paid to
the Respondent on account of taxed costs.
28 June 2005.
(DATO’ ABDUL HAMID BIN HAJI MOHAMAD)
Hakim Mahkamah
Persekutuan
Counsel
for the Appellant:
Encik Maniam Raju
bersama Encik Asmawi bin
Ismail
Encik Indran Guru
Solicitors
for the Appellant:
Tetuan Ng, Fan &
Associates
Peguambela & Peguamcara.
Counsel
for the Respondent:
Dr. Wong Kim Fatt
Bersama Encik Tho Kam Chew
Cik Tng Poh Ying
Solicitors
for the Respondent:
Tetuan Gulam & Wong
Peguambela & Peguamcara