DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA

 

(BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN)

 

RAYUAN SIVIL NO. W-02-792-2005

 

ANTARA

 

DR. DAVID VANNIASINGHAM RAMANATHAN              PERAYU

 

DAN

 

SUBANG JAYA MEDICAL CENTRE SDN BHD                  RESPONDEN

 

 

 

[Dalam Perkara Saman Pemula No. R1-24-56 Tahun 2005 Dalam Mahkamah

 Tinggi Malaya di Kuala Lumpur (Bahagian Rayuan Dan Kuasa-Kuasa Khas)

 

                                               Dalam perkara mengenai pekerjaan Plaintif sebagai seorang doctor di hospital Defendan sejak 1/7/1985 dan “Notice of Non-Renewal” bertarikh 1/6/2005 yang dikeluarkan oleh Defendan

 

                                               Dan

 

                                               Dalam perkara mengenai Representasi bagi Pengembalian Jawatan bertarikh 30/6/2005 yang dimasukkan oleh Plaintif di Jabatan Perhubungan Perusahaan, Kuala Lumpur pada 1/7/2005

 

                                               Dan

 

                                               Dalam perkara mengenai Perkara 8(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan

 

                                               Dan

 

                                               Dalam perkara mengenai Perenggan 1 dalam Jadual kepada Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964

 

                                               Dan

 

                                               Dalam perkara mengenai Seksyen-seksyen 20(1), 1(A), (2) dan (3) Akta Perhubungan Perusahaan 1967

 

                                               Dan

                                               Dalam perkara mengenai Seksyen-seksyen 41, 42, 50, 51, 52, 53 dan 55 Akta Relif Spesifik 1950

 

                                               Dan

 

                                               Dalam perkara mengenai Aturan 7, Aturan 28, Aturan 15 kaedah 16, Aturan 29 dan Aturan 92 kaedah 4 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980

 

 

ANTARA

 

DR. DAVID VANNIASINGHAM RAMANATHAN                     PLAINTIF

 

DAN

 

SUBANG JAYA MEDICAL CENTRE SDN BHD                         DEFENDAN]

 

 

                  Coram:    

                                    Abdul Aziz Mohamad, JCA (now FCJ)

                                    Mohd Ghazali Mohd Yusoff, JCA

                                    Zaleha Zahari, JCA

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

 

1.                                       1.   The appellant, a general surgeon, had been practising as a medical practitioner at the respondents’ hospital since 1985 under successive agreements called “Agreement Active Status”, the last of which was dated 1 October 1995.  He was not drawing a salary for working at the hospital but instead he received professional fees from the patients he treated, less agreed deductions in favour of the respondents for expenses incurred by the respondents.  The appellant had to pay the respondents rental for the use of the hospital’s clinic facilities.  The appellant never entered into a contract of employment with the respondents.  The Agreement Active Status, in which the appellant and the respondents were referred to respectively as “the Consultant” and “SJMC”, was not a contract of employment.  It was an agreement setting out terms and conditions of the appointment of the appellant by the respondents “to practise as a medical professional in the Hospital” (clause 1).  Clause 13 ranked the appellant as an independent contractor in these words: “For the purposes of this Agreement and all the obligations undertaken and the services to be provided hereunder, the Consultant shall be an independent contractor and not the agent or servant of SJMC”.  Clause 7 provided as follows:

“7.       PERIOD Of AGREEMENT

           

a)      This Agreement shall come into force on the 1st day of October 1995 for a period up to 1st August 1996 and shall be automatically renewed for a period of three (3) years unless either party gives at least sixty (60) days prior written notice to the other party of its intention not to renew the agreement.  At the end of the first three year renewal the contract will be automatically further renewed for subsequent three year periods until the consultant reaches 60 years of age unless either party gives written notice of at least sixty (60) days prior to the term ending to the other party of its intention not to renew the agreement.  After the Consultant attains the age of sixty (60), his appointment shall automatically be renewed for successive periods of one (1) year each, provided that either party may terminate this Agreement by giving written notice to the other of its intention not to renew the consultant’s appointment not later than sixty (60) days before the expiry of a one-year renewal period.

 

b)     In the event SJMC elects not to renew any term of        this Agreement, SJMC agrees to hold prior               consultation with and receive input from the       MAB.

 

c) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, this        Agreement may at any time be terminated by mutual consent of the parties hereto.”

 

 

           

2.         On 1 June 2005 the respondents issued to the appellant a “Notice of Non-Renewal” pursuant to clause 7(a), giving the appellant 60 days’ notice of their intention not to renew the agreement.  The 60 days would lapse on 31 July 2005.

 

3.         Considering himself a “workman” as defined in the Industrial Relations Act 1967 and the respondents his employer and the notice as tantamount to a dismissal of himself by his employer without just cause or excuse, on 1 July 2005 the appellant filed at the appropriate office of the Director General for Industrial Relations his representations in writing to be reinstated in his former, or what would soon be his former, office. The making of the representations was done pursuant to section 20(1) of the Act.  The Director General was to take necessary steps towards an expeditious settlement of the representations.  If there was no likelihood of the representations being settled he was to report to the Minister, who, under section 20(3), may, if he thinks fit, refer the representations to the Industrial Court for an award.

4.         On 18 July 2005 the appellant filed the originating summons in this case at the High Court together with an ex parte summons-in-chambers under the originating summons.  Except that the originating summons had additionally a prayer for a declaration of entitlement to apply, both the originating summons and the summons-in-chambers sought various injunctions whose effect would be that the appellant would continue to function at the respondents’ hospital as before, until, in the case of the summons-in-chambers, the originating summons are disposed of, and in the case of the originating summons, until, if the representations are not referred by the Minister to the Industrial Court, it is finally determined after judicial review and appeals that the decision not to refer was correct, or until, if the representations are referred to the Industrial Court, the Industrial Court decides on them.

 

5.         As to the appellant’s reason for needing the injunction, in his oral submission before us the appellant’s counsel submitted that if the appellant was allowed to remain and work at the hospital, should he succeed in getting reinstatement, he would be there already, whereas if he was deprived of his job for many years before he succeeded in the Industrial Court, the court might not order reinstatement for reason of unfitness or unsuitability as happened in R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia [1997] 1 MLJ 145 at p. 185 D-E.  In this connection counsel cited Goddard CJ’s lament in Ashton v Shoreline Hotel [1994] 1 ERNZ 421 at page 436 about the remedy of reinstatement in the Employment Tribunal having become “something of an endangered species” and his call for the ordering of reinstatement where there is no good reason for refusing to order it.  It is fair to point out that the fear of not being given reinstatement was not quite the reason given by the appellant in his affidavit.  In paragraph 23 of his affidavit dated 18 July 2005 the appellant said that if interim injunction was refused him the remedy of reinstatement might be rendered nugatory.  After setting out the several stages of the process that representations under section 20(1) have to go through before they are decided by the Industrial Court, the appellant said:

“(b)      This process may easily take up to 3 years, if not longer.  Thus, the statutory remedy of reinstatement             may be meaningless when and if it is awarded given          that the fairly large body of patients under my care          would have been reassigned or referred to other             doctors and my position as a Consultant General Surgeon in the Defendant hospital extinguished.”

 

What the appellant feared was not that reinstatement would be refused him but that “when and if it is awarded” the order of reinstatement might be meaningless for the stated reasons.

 

6.         At the High Court the learned judge heard the summons-in-chambers inter partes, and he dismissed it.  Consequently he also dismissed the originating summons.  This appeal followed.

7.         The learned judge agreed with the respondents’ contention that such an injunction as the plaintiff sought “cannot be given during the pendency of a representation for reinstatement under the Act”.  He went on to say in paragraph 15 of the grounds of judgment: “In fact there has been a succession of cases which have declined or revoked interim injunction during the pendency of a referral to the Industrial Court or even after a referral to the Industrial Court.”  Three cases were cited.  We agree with the appellant’s counsel that two of them are not reinstatement cases and therefore are of little assistance to the question in hand.  They are RCA Sdn Bhd v Pekerja-Pekerja RCA Sdn Bhd [1991] 1 MLJ 309 and Kuantan Beach Hotel Sdn Bhd v Kesatuan Kebangsaan Pekerja-Pekerja Hotel, Bar & Restoran Semenanjung Malaysia [2004] 6 MLJ 608.

 

8.         The other case, which appears to be a reinstatement case, is Penang Han Chiang Associated Chinese School Association v National Union of Teachers in Independent Schools, West Malaysia [1988] 1 MLJ 302, a decision of the Supreme Court, then the apex court.  It was about certain teachers employed by the appellants on a fixed term, yearly, basis under service agreements which provided for renewal of the contract.  Disputes arose between the appellants and the teachers but the cause or nature of the disputes is not spelt out in the judgment.  A complaint was made to the Ministry concerned and the Minister referred the complaint to the Industrial Court under section 8 of the Act.  After that the respondents, who acted for the teachers, filed a civil suit in the High Court, whose aim is not disclosed in the judgment, and obtained an interlocutory injunction the terms or purport of which are also not disclosed.  The Supreme Court, on appeal, finding that the granting of the interlocutory injunction by the High Court was not an exercise of judicial discretion, said that “the appellate court is at liberty to rehear the whole application on its merits” and proceeded to state the following conclusion:

           Now, this is an action where the respondents, purporting to represent former teachers employed by the appellant, alleges breaches of service contracts, which trade dispute had been referred by the Minister of Labour to the Industrial Court for a hearing.  In our judgment, when a trade dispute had been invested in the Industrial Court, particularly one involving allegation of wrongful dismissal, the High Court should be slow to interfere by way of interlocutory injunction except for very special circumstances and none appeared to have been shown by the respondents in the court below.  Nor was any attempt to establish it during the hearing of the appeal.  The reason, in our opinion, is obvious.  The Industrial Court is the proper forum to deal with such complaint since it is empowered by the Industrial Relations Act 1967 (as amended) to order the employer to reinstate the workman in his former position or a similar position if the Industrial Court should hold that the dismissal was without just cause or excuse.  No such power is vested in the High Court.  The jurisdiction of the High Court is limited to an award of damages for breach of contract for wrongful dismissal or termination only and damages are usually inadequate compensation for loss of employment (see Vine v National Dock Labour Board [1957] A.C. 488).”

 

We take that to be a conclusion reached after rehearing the whole application on its merits.  The interlocutory injunction was set aside.

9.         From the phrases “allegation of wrongful dismissal” and “to reinstate the workman” in the passage it may be assumed that in that case the teachers had complained of wrongful dismissal and had sought reinstatement, although it is not revealed how all that was connected to a reference under section 8, which concerns complaints of contravention of sections 4, 5 and 7 about rights in respect of trade unionism.  But the message is clear.  Where a trade dispute, “particularly one involving allegation of wrongful dismissal”, is with the Industrial Court, the High Court should not, by way of interlocutory injunction, “interfere”, which we take to include giving relief to either party.  Excepted are “very special circumstances”.

 

10.       As to why the Supreme Court considered that the granting of the interlocutory injunction was not an exercise of judicial discretion, the reason is given at page 303 G-I (left) in the following words:

“The learned judge did not appear to consider the balance of convenience.  If he had done so, he seemed to have disregarded the well-established rule that a contract for service or service contract would not be specifically enforced by the High Court (see section 20((1)(b) of the Specific Relief Act 1950) and that an injunction cannot be granted to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced (see section 54(f) of the same Act and Hill v C.A. Parson & Co. Ltd. [1977] 3 All E.R. 1345).”

 

Although disregard of the unavailability of injunction to specifically enforce a service contract was the reason for the finding that the granting of the interlocutory injunction in that case was not an exercise of judicial discretion, the decision of the Supreme Court to set aside the interlocutory injunction after rehearing the whole application on its merits was not founded on that reason.  From the passage earlier quoted in which the Supreme Court stated their conclusion, the reason appears to be of a jurisdictional nature.  The thinking seems to be that since the power to decide a trade dispute, including the reinstatement of a workman, is vested in the Industrial Court and not in the High Court, the High Court has no jurisdiction to play any role in respect of the dispute, including the granting of interlocutory injunctions for the relief of a party to the dispute.

 

11.       Learned counsel for the appellant in his oral submission advanced this argument in order to persuade us not to treat the decision as good authority.  He said that it was not brought to the attention of the Supreme Court that section 20(1) of the Act provides, by the remedy of reinstatement, an exception to the rule that a contract of service cannot be specifically enforced and that in Fung Keong Rubber Manufacturing (M) Sdn. Bhd. v Lee Eng Kiat & Ors [1981] 1 MLJ 238 the Federal Court, the then apex court, at page 239 H (right), described the remedy of reinstatement as “a statutorily recognized form of specific performance”.   The argument might be relevant only if the reason for the setting aside of the interlocutory injunction was because a contract of  service cannot be specifically enforced, but as has been observed, that was not the reason.  The reason was of a jurisdictional nature.

 

12.       The appellant’s counsel also sought to distinguish the Penang Han Chiang case from the present case by the fact that in that case the dispute had gone to the Industrial Court whereas in this case the dispute was still with the Director General.  We do not think that makes any difference to the application of the decision in the Penang Han Chiang case.  The dispute in this case is going to end up in the Industrial Court if the Director General fails to settle it and the Minister decides to refer it to the Industrial Court.

 

13.       The appellant’s counsel further submitted that according to Penang Han Chiang an interlocutory injunction may be issued in “very special circumstances”.  Apart from the fact that the decision gives no indication of the kind of circumstances that may be considered very special and the fact that we are moreover reluctant to hold that the circumstances in this case are very special, it seems to us that the Supreme Court themselves did not envisage the existence of very special excepting circumstances as likely.  They said that no attempt had been made to show the existence of very special circumstances in the appeal and the reason for the absence of such an attempt was, to them, the obvious one of jurisdiction.  It was as though to the Supreme Court, for the reason of jurisdiction, and not for any want of merit, any attempt to show the existence of very special circumstances would have been in vain, and the respondents knew it.

 

14.       It makes good sense that in a case of representations for reinstatement under section 20(1) of the Act the High Court should not grant, or should be incapable of granting, an interlocutory injunction so that the workman remains in the job until the determination of his representations.  The Minister, in deciding under section 20(3) whether or not “he thinks fit” to refer a workman’s representations to the Industrial Court, will have to act according as to whether he finds that there are issues that need to be tried in the Industrial Court.  In this case, for instance, the issues are whether the appellant is a “workman” and, if he is, whether the respondents’ refusal to renew the agreement was valid.  The decision of the Minister is subject to judicial review by the High Court subsequently.  For the High Court to now consider granting an interlocutory injunction, it will have to decide, first and foremost, whether there are serious issues to be tried in the Industrial Court as regards those matters.  But that is a question that has to be decided also by the Minister as a statutory duty.  If the High Court were to decide the question in dealing with the application for the interlocutory injunction, it would embarrass the Minister in his decision whether or not to refer the representations to the Industrial Court.  The High Court would already have answered a question which may have to be answered on a judicial review of the decision of the Minister to refer or not to refer the representations to the Industrial Court.  Therefore the High Court ought not to have to find, except on a judicial review, whether there are serious questions to be tried in the Industrial Court, and since such a finding is an essential step in the granting of an interlocutory injunction, the bar to making such a finding should be a bar to granting an interlocutory injunction.

 

15.       The learned judge was right in relying on Penang Han Chiang as an authority that bars the granting of the interlocutory injunction that the appellant sought.  That authority is binding on us, but apart from that, as has been explained, it is right that an interlocutory injunction should be incapable of being granted to enable a workman to remain in his job until his representations come to the end of the process.  It is therefore not necessary to consider the string of cases from other jurisdictions cited by the appellant’s counsel, headed by Hill v C.A. Parsons & Co. Ltd. [1972] 1 Ch. 305, to persuade us that interlocutory injunctions have been granted as an exception to the rule that contracts of service are not specifically enforceable, beyond saying that those are not cases that involved the impediment of another jurisdiction, the industrial-relations jurisdiction, as the present case does.

 

16.       We dismiss this appeal with costs and order that the deposit be paid to the respondents to account of taxed costs.

 

Dated: 8 December 2006

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DATO’ ABDUL AZIZ BIN MOHAMAD

Judge

Federal Court of Malaysia

 

 

 

 

 

Counsel for the appellant:                Su Tiang Joo

                                                            (Teh Eng Lay with him)

 

Solicitors for the appellant:             Cheah Teh & Su

 

 

Counsel for the respondents:           Dato’ M. Pathmanathan

(Rutheran Sivagnanam with him)

 

Solicitors for the respondents:        R. Sivagnanam & Associates

 

 

 

 

 

 

D:J-W0279205(CAV)

8.12.2006