

**IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF MALAYSIA
(APPELLATE JURISDICTION)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.: 01(f)-35-11/2020(W)**

Between

1. CCH

2. ADY

**(On behalf of themselves and
as Litigation Representatives of one
CYM, a child)**

...Appellants

And

**Pendaftar Besar bagi Kelahiran
dan Kematian, Malaysia**

...Respondent

SUMMARY OF GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

[1] This appeal concerns essentially the question of the entitlement of a child, who was abandoned at birth and later adopted, to Malaysian citizenship by operation of law.

[2] This case began when the appellants filed an application for judicial review against the respondent in the High Court seeking for inter alia, a declaration that the child ("Child") is a citizen of Malaysia by operation of law by virtue of his birth within the Federation of Malaysia pursuant to Article 14(1)(b), Part II section 1 paragraph (e) and section 2(3) of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution ('FC').

BACKGROUND FACTS

[3] Sometime in January 2004, the appellants were informed by a friend of theirs that a baby boy (the Child) was born and abandoned at Hospital Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Cheras. The appellants jointly decided that they would adopt the Child and named him CYM.

[4] According to the appellants, they were under the impression that they had formally adopted CYM. As such, when they completed the forms and provided information to the respondent, they represented themselves as the Child's biological parents. The respondent accordingly issued the appellants with the Child's birth certificate on 20.2.2004 ('1st Birth Certificate').

[5] Sometime in April 2016, when the Child turned twelve years old, the appellants applied to the National Registration Department ('NRD') for a MyKad for the Child. The NRD declined to issue a MyKad to the Child.

[6] In the process of applying for the MyKad, the NRD officer who inspected the Child's 1st Birth Certificate, apparently noted some inaccuracies in their names. This was either between the appellants and the Child or between the appellants' children (that is the Child and another female child that the appellants had earlier adopted – with the initials TYS).

[7] Thus, the respondent had reason to believe that the appellants were not the biological parents of the Child because when they inspected the Child's 1st Birth Certificate, they noticed a difference in surnames between TYS and the Child.

[8] The NRD officer explained to the appellants that the appellants would have to surrender the 1st Birth Certificate so that a new birth certificate could be issued for the Child stating the correct facts of parenthood.

[9] The appellants complied, surrendered the 1st Birth Certificate and accordingly on 3.11.2016 were issued with a new birth certificate for the Child ('2nd Birth Certificate').

[10] The 2nd Birth Certificate, most crucially, recorded the Child's parents' information as 'not available' (*'maklumat tidak diperoleh'*) and the Child's citizenship status as 'yet to be determined' (*'belum ditentukan'*).

The 3rd Birth Certificate and the Filing of the Judicial Review Application

[11] Dissatisfied with the details (or lack thereof) contained in the 2nd Birth Certificate, the appellants sought legal advice which led to the filing of originating summons in the High Court in Malaya at Penang in case number PA-34-3-01/2017 ('Adoption Summons').

[12] On 20.7.2017, the learned Judicial Commissioner, after the usual process of hearing from the Welfare Department and completing the standard procedures, granted the Adoption Order.

[13] In Annexure 'A' of the Adoption Order, under the header 'Date and State of Birth of the Child', it is recorded as a fact that the Child was born on 31.1.2004 at Hospital Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Cheras.

[14] Armed with the Adoption Order, the appellants reapplied for a new birth certificate for the Child. On 21.9.2017, the respondent issued the 3rd Birth Certificate where the information in the column on 'status of citizenship' was stated as 'non-citizen' ('*bukan warganegara*');

[15] The primary issue the appellants have with the changes made in the 3rd Birth Certificate is that the Child was essentially rendered a non-citizen and since he is not a citizen of any other country, effectively stateless.

[16] A material fact to take note of is that the appellants have averred, and the respondent cannot suggest otherwise, that the citizenship status and identities of the Child's biological parents in this case are completely unknown.

The Material Constitutional Provisions

[17] Before delving into the arguments, we find it necessary to first set out the constitutional provisions material to this appeal as follows:

"Article 14 (Citizen by operation of law)

14. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Part, the following persons are citizens by operation of law, that is to say:

(a) ...

(b) every person born on or after Merdeka Day, and having any of the qualifications specified in Part II of the Second Schedule...

Article 31 (Application of Second Schedule)

31. Until Parliament otherwise provides, the supplementary provisions contained in Part III of the Second Schedule shall have effect for the purposes of this Part.

...

SECOND SCHEDULE

...

PART II

[Article 14(1)(b)]

**CITIZENSHIP BY OPERATION OF LAW OF PERSONS BORN ON OR
AFTER MALAYSIA DAY**

1. Subject to the provisions of Part III of this Constitution, the following persons born on or after Malaysia Day are citizens by operation of law, that is to say:

(a) every person born within the Federation of whose parents one at least is at the time of birth either a citizen or permanently resident in the Federation; and...

...

(e) every person born within the Federation who is not born a citizen of any country otherwise than by virtue of this paragraph.

2. (1) ...

(2) ...

(3) For the purposes of paragraph (e) of section 1 a person is to be treated as having at birth any citizenship which he acquires within one year afterwards by virtue of any provisions corresponding to paragraph (c) of that section or otherwise.

PART III

[Article 31]

SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS RELATING TO CITIZENSHIP

...

Interpretation

...

19B. For the purposes of Part I or II of this Schedule any new born child found exposed in any place shall be presumed, until the contrary is shown, to have been born there of a mother permanently resident there; and if he is treated by virtue of this section as so born, the date of the finding shall be taken to be the date of the birth.”.

Submissions and Decisions of the Courts Below

[18] To summarise, firstly, the appellants appeared to argue that the Child is entitled to citizenship under section 1(e) of Part II. Learned counsel essentially argued that because the Child was born an abandoned child, there is no proof that he is a citizen of any other country and is thereby entitled to citizenship under section 1(e).

[19] On this issue, the Courts below found, based on previously decided cases that in order to fulfil the requirements of section 1(e), the applicant must show that his or her birth parents are not citizens of any other country.

[20] The second argument advanced by the appellants was that the Child ought to be accorded citizenship pursuant to section 1(a) of Part II. The appellants contended that the word 'parents' in that section ought to be construed liberally to include adoptive parents. They further argued that provisions of the Adoption Act 1952 which confer full legal rights on adoptive parents and which extinguish all legal connection to the biological parents, ought to be read into section 1(a).

[21] The High Court and the Court of Appeal rejected these arguments. Both Courts were guided by earlier precedents of the High Court and the Court of Appeal which have held that section 1(a) must be construed having regard to the words 'at the time of birth'. As such, the Courts below were of the view that the word 'parents' means biological parents and the word 'parents' is essentially incapable of being stretched to mean 'adoptive parents'. Further, reliance cannot be placed on ordinary law to interpret provisions of the FC which reigns supreme.

Proceedings in the Federal Court

[22] The appellants were granted leave to appeal to this Court on the following questions:

“Question 1

Whether a child who (i) was born in Malaysia and (ii) did not acquire citizenship of any other country within one year from his date of birth, is a citizen of Malaysia by operation of law pursuant to Article 14(1)(b) and Part II Section 1(e) and Section 2(3) of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution?

Question 2

Whether Part II Section 1(e) of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution requires a child to prove the identity of his/her biological parents and/or that they are not foreign citizens?

Question 3

Whether the word “parents” in Part II Section 1(a) of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution should be given a restrictive interpretation to mean only the child’s biological parents?

Question 4

Whether a certificate of birth issued under Section 25A of the Adoption Act 1952 shall pursuant to subsection (5) “for all purposes be known as the Certificate of Birth of the child” and pursuant to subsection (6) “shall be received without further or other proof as evidence” of the child’s parents for the purposes of Article 14(1)(b) and Part II Section 1(a) of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution?

Question 5

Whether a birth certificate which has been “surrendered” to the Registrar-General of Births and Deaths pursuant to Section 25A(1)(b) of the Adoption Act 1952 and “replaced” by a new birth certificate issued pursuant to section 25A(5) of the Adoption Act 1952, can still be referred to by the Registrar General of

Births and Deaths or the courts for the purposes of determining the child's "parents"?".

OUR DECISION/ANALYSIS

Whether the Child is Entitled to Citizenship by Operation of Law

[23] After considering the facts of this case in light of the submissions made, we are of the considered view that none of the Leave Questions need be considered or answered. This is because the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case do not call for such deliberation.

[24] During the hearing of this case, we queried counsel for the appellant on whether section 19B of Part III ought to be read together with section 1(a) of Part II. He conceded that such a reading was possible. We also asked the same question of Senior Federal Counsel ('SFC') and he accepted the same though he took issue with the facts i.e. that he is unable to concede that the Child was in fact abandoned. We shall address that issue later.

[25] On issues of law, Courts are always required to apply their own judicial minds and reasoning to determine points of law quite without regard to parties' concessions on them. We shall therefore proceed to deliberate on the application of section 1(a) of Part II read alongside with section 19B of Part III.

Interpretation of Section 1(a) of Part II and Section 19B of Part III

[26] The principles of *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* as well as the principles on how the FC was drafted to enable citizenship as broadly as possible while weeding out statelessness have been discussed in great length by the minority of this Court in *CTEB & Anor v Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara, Malaysia & Ors* [2021] 4 MLJ 236 ('CTEB'). We adopt the reasoning there as part of this judgment being the only other decision of the Federal Court apart from this one, to our knowledge, to have touched on this issue most recently.

[27] Before proceeding to examine section 19B, we seek to remind ourselves of other important concepts on constitutional interpretation.

[28] Citizenship no doubt is governed by Part III of the FC, but it is also a concept so inextricably linked to the right to life and personal liberty contained in Article 5(1).

[29] It is an established canon of construction that when construing a word or words in the FC protective of or guaranteeing a fundamental right, the Court should give their widest possible meaning without changing or warping the 'base' meaning. And when construing interrelated provisions, the Court should read them as a whole having regard to the purpose and intent of those provisions and harmonise their collective meaning rather than put them at odds with one another.

[30] Section 1(a) of Part II very clearly adopts the concepts of *jus soli* (citizenship based on birth place) and *jus sanguinis* (citizenship based on

blood relation). Section 19B in turn contains two presumptions – one of which relates to *jus sanguinis*.

[31] The operative words in section 19B are ‘any new born child found **exposed** in any place’. The purpose of this section, when read in context, must be to cover new born children who are left and discovered in a place without any trace of their biological parents. We take judicial notice of the harsh realities of life, this includes new born children left abandoned near dumpsites, baby hatches, public or school toilets, places of worship and so on. A literal meaning of ‘exposed’ suggests a new born child who was ‘discovered’ exposed at any of these locations.

[32] As such, the broadest possible interpretation of the word ‘found exposed’ is to accord it a meaning to include a child abandoned at the place of birth by the birth mother whose identity is unknown. The operative word ‘exposed’ in section 19B must therefore encompass the plight of abandoned new born children, otherwise the overarching intent of preventing statelessness would be defeated or rendered illusory.

[33] In the present case, it has been an accepted fact that the Child is an abandoned Child who was born in Hospital Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Cheras. This fact was acknowledged in the Adoption Order and in the 3rd Birth Certificate. During the hearing, learned SFC disagreed with the application of section 19B to the facts of this appeal, suggesting that the appellants had actively concealed facts, that the identity of the biological parents is known or discoverable but kept hidden.

[34] The simple answer to that assertion is this. The follow up words in section 19B are contained in the phrase 'until the contrary is shown'. Meaning, any person who claims that the child was not 'found exposed' or otherwise abandoned by the mother as the case may be, bears the burden of showing the identity of the mother and more importantly, that the mother is not permanently resident at the place of the finding.

[35] Evidence-wise, the answer to this predicament is in the recent judgment of this Court in *Rosliza bt Ibrahim v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Anor* [2021] 2 MLJ 181 ('*Rosliza*') which deals with proof of negative facts. It is quite illogical in this appeal to expect the appellants to show that they do not have knowledge of the biological parents or the mother at least.

[36] There is nothing in the evidence, as far as we have examined it, to suggest that the appellants were lying about the fact of abandonment. According to section 19B therefore, the burden of showing that the Child's mother was not permanently resident at the place of finding rests on the respondent. Given that the Child was born in the said Hospital, surely the respondent has the means to verify from the Hospital's admission records, the identity of the Child's biological mother, if not the father. Therefore, as the record stands, the respondent has not been able to discharge that burden.

[37] This leads us now to the final portions of section 19B. Once it is shown or averred that a new born child is 'found exposed' (or abandoned), two things are presumed, that is:

- (i) that the child is born to a mother who is permanently resident at the place where the finding was made (the *jus sanguinis* presumption); and
- (ii) the date of the finding is taken as the date of the birth.

[38] Once section 19B is invoked, any party challenging any of these presumptions must either show that (i) the child was not born of a mother permanently resident at the place where the new born child was found, or (ii) the date of the finding is not the date of the birth. It is really only a contest on the earlier which determines citizenship because of the wording of section 1(a) which requires that a child born within the Federation to be born of at least either one parent who is either a citizen or, more important to this case, of a parent permanently resident in the Federation.

[39] Putting it another way, the place of the finding, if within the Federation would satisfy the *jus soli* requirement of section 1(a) of Part II. The presumption, once it applies, automatically serves to complete the *jus sanguinis* (parenthood) aspect of section 1(a) unless anyone claiming to the contrary can prove otherwise.

[40] Hence, what remains at this stage is a simple application of the law to the facts of the case. Since the Child was found abandoned in the location aforementioned, it is presumed that he was born to a mother permanently resident there. It follows that he is taken to fulfil the requirements of section 1(a) of Part II read with section 19B of Part III as he, having been born at Hospital Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, was

born within the Federation and his mother is presumed to be permanently resident in the Federation.

[41] In the premises, it is our judgment that the Child is quite simply entitled to citizenship by operation of law by virtue of section 1(a) of Part II read with section 19B of Part III.

The Effect of this Judgment

[42] Firstly, a wholesome reading of section 1(a) of Part II with section 19B of Part III obviates the need for us to consider whether the Child was stateless. A discussion on the effect of sections 1(e) and 2(3) of Part II is therefore unnecessary. Similarly, the right of the appellants as adoptive parents to confer citizenship on the Child vis-à-vis section 1(a) of Part II is also unnecessary because the application of the presumption in section 19B operates to confer citizenship on the Child even prior to the fact of his adoption whether considered informally in 2004 or formally by the fact of the Adoption Order in 2017.

[43] Secondly, the natural result of our above discussion is that this appeal must be allowed. The judgments of the High Court and Court of Appeal are reversed and set aside *in toto* and ought not to be relied upon as precedent in the future as all observations made on the application of sections 1(e) and 1(a) (in relation to adoptive parents) are *obiter dicta* given that the facts of this case do not call for such legal findings.

[44] Thirdly, this case is now precedent on how the Ministry of Home Affairs (generally) and the NRD and Registrar-General of Births and Deaths (specifically) ought to deal with all such future cases within the

context of abandoned new born children. When confronted with an application for registration of such new born children, the burden is on the respondent to undertake proper investigations to determine the status of such child's biological parents or mother. If, after investigation, it is found that the fact of abandonment is true, the respondent is obligated by the highest law of the land in section 19B of Part III to recognise that new born child's citizenship by operation of law, except where there is evidence to the contrary as we had stated earlier.

[45] Applying the law to the facts, and to repeat what was said earlier, it is abundantly clear that the respondent failed to apply their minds to the provision in section 19B of Part III. Following *Rosliza* (supra), how are the appellants to prove a negative fact, that is, the fact that they do not know the biological parents of the Child? The learned SFC contended that the appellants concealed facts which in turn connotes that the appellants somehow know the identity of the Child's biological parents. This, with respect, is mere supposition unsupported by evidence.

[46] The Ministry of Home Affairs, of which the respondent is an integral part, have all the important machinery of the State at their disposal to conduct appropriate investigations to ascertain the truth. The respondent has not discharged their legal burden to rebut the presumption of permanent residence of the Child's mother in section 19B. Further, the respondent did not directly address or respond to any of the positive averments made by the appellants regarding how the Child was found abandoned, thus leaving those averments admitted.

[47] In the circumstances, rather than denying the Child citizenship because they were not able to gather any evidence of the Child's birth/biological parents, the respondent ought to have given effect to section 1(a) of Part II read together with section 19B of Part III. They had no right or discretion to do anything else certainly much less render the child stateless.

[48] In this regard and with respect, we are minded to observe that citizenship by operation of law is a right – a fundamental and constitutional right. It leaves absolutely no room for the exercise of subjective notions or presuppositions on what citizenship is. The words citizenship 'by operation of law' could not be any clearer, and there is no room whatsoever for discretion.

Remedies/Conclusion

[49] For the reasons stated above, this appeal is allowed and we hereby set aside the orders and judgments of the Courts below. There shall be no order as to costs as is the standard practice in cases of public interest such as this one.

[50] We hereby grant the following orders:

"1. A declaration that CYM ('Child') is a citizen of Malaysia by operation of law by virtue of his birth within the Federation of Malaysia pursuant to Article 14(1)(b), section (1) paragraph (a) of Part II of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution read together with section 19B of Part III of the Second Schedule of the Federal Constitution;

2. An order of certiorari to quash the decision of the respondent of 21.9.2017 to issue the birth certificate (Register No: 00019676, Serial No.: 001692XA) dated 21.9.2017 (“Birth Certificate”) of the Child and signed by the Respondent which registers the Child as a non-citizen (*bukan warganegara*) instead of a citizen of Malaysia; and
3. An order in the nature of mandamus directing the Respondent to reissue the birth certificate of the Child to register the Child as a citizen of Malaysia”.

Dated: 19th November 2021.

(TENGKU MAIMUN BINTI TUAN MAT)
Chief Justice,
Federal Court of Malaysia.

Note: This is only a summary of the final grounds of judgment. The authoritative text is the final grounds of judgment.